Rush, C.J.
A trial court may modify or revoke a spousal maintenance award under Indiana Code section 31-15-7-3(1) if it determines that there have been “changed circumstances so substantial and continuing as to make the terms unreasonable.” In making that determination, the trial court has broad discretion in weighing evidence of the parties’ financial circumstances. Here, the trial court concluded that the disabled former wife’s remarriage had changed her finances, but not substantially enough to warrant revoking maintenance. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the trial court had disregarded undisputed evidence that her total marital assets had substantially increased.
We disagree. Even though the change in the former wife’s finances could appear substantial at first blush, the evidence in the light favorable to the judgment supports the trial court’s findings, and those findings support its refusal to revoke maintenance. And because we affirm the trial court as to maintenance, we also affirm its award of attorney fees in the former wife’s favor.
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We begin with the threshold question Anne presents on transfer: Whether a court may revoke incapacity maintenance for recipients who remain incapacitated, but have a substantial and continuing change in their financial circumstances. She argues that unless a recipient is no longer disabled, a change in circumstances warrants only modifying maintenance, while permanently revoking it is warranted only for recipients who are no longer incapacitated to the extent that their ability to support themselves is materially affected. We disagree, because even though revoking maintenance for a still-disabled spouse is an extreme remedy that should be exercised with great caution, it is nevertheless authorized by statute.
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As a practical matter, though, that standard is more daunting for revoking maintenance than merely modifying it—especially when, as here, the underlying incapacity is permanent. The party seeking modification bears the burden of proving that the asserted change of conditions is so substantial and continuing that the existing maintenance award is unreasonable. Myers v. Myers, 560 N.E.2d 39, 43 (Ind. 1990). For a modification, it is enough to show changes are “substantial and continuing” enough to make the existing award unreasonably excessive or inadequate, and the opportunity remains open for future modifications. But because revoking an award means extinguishing it forever, it necessarily entails proving that the change is so “substantial and continuing” that the very existence of the award has become unreasonable—not only in the present, but under any reasonably foreseeable future circumstances as well.
In some cases, that showing may be relatively straightforward. For instance, if the recipient spouse has recovered from the condition on which the award was based, there is no longer an incapacity at all to support maintenance. Or the payor might prove (as Kevin attempted to do in the trial court) that because of improved employment prospects, the incapacity is no longer a material impediment to the recipient’s “ability . . . to support himself or herself,” I.C. § 31-15-7-2(1)—so that despite ongoing incapacity, there is no longer a necessity.
Here, though, Anne’s vision loss is undisputedly permanent—and Kevin does not challenge the trial court’s finding that her employability likewise has not improved. Accordingly, Kevin’s petition to revoke must depend on proving that Anne’s remarriage has not just improved her finances, but improved them so substantially as to foreclose any reasonable need for additional support in the future. We therefore begin with the trial court’s findings about the parties’ finances, and then consider whether, in view of those findings, Kevin carried his burden of proving that maintenance should be revoked.
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Kevin argues that the court failed to consider substantial income and assets that became available to Anne when she married Paul. Gertiser II, 24 N.E.3d at 524. In his view, the undisputed evidence that Paul and Anne have over $600,000 in total marital assets, and that his base pay is modestly lower than Paul’s, should have compelled the trial court to find that it had become unreasonable to pay any maintenance at all. But as discussed above, our role is not to reweigh the evidence or substitute our judgment for the trial court’s, Best, 941 N.E.2d at 502, but only to determine whether the evidence supports the findings and whether those findings support the judgment, T.L., 4 N.E.3d at 662.
Here, the trial court made no detailed calculations about either party’s finances. Instead, it found in general terms that both Anne’s and Kevin’s finances had changed and concluded that those changes did not warrant modification….
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We conclude that, in view of its findings, the trial court correctly refused to revoke maintenance. As discussed above, proving that a change in circumstances is so “substantial and continuing” as to require revoking maintenance is a steep showing. But at the hearing, that was the only relief Kevin sought, expressly disclaiming any alternative request for merely reducing the award. In fact, his counsel characterized his motion as seeking “termination of spousal maintenance.” Tr. 7:4–5. And even after Anne’s counsel had conceded in opening that “the Court would have discretion to modify without terminating the spousal maintenance,” Tr. 8:6–7, [Footnote omitted.] Kevin remained adamant that he wanted only revocation, not just modification:
Q Okay, now you’re asking the Court to modify, or actually, you are not asking the Court to modify the maintenance, you want the Court to just eliminate it, right?
A That’s correct.
Tr. 121:20–24. Again, revoking maintenance required Kevin to prove not merely that the maintenance award had become unreasonably excessive, but its very existence had become unreasonable. And under the facts as found by the trial court, any change in Anne’s finances was not of a magnitude that made it unreasonable to leave a maintenance order in place. Since Kevin made no alternative argument for a reduction, we need not consider (and express no opinion about) whether a modification might have been warranted. In this procedural posture, where Kevin chose to seek all-or-nothing relief, we agree that these findings support denying the drastic remedy he requested.
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Conclusion
Even though the trial court would have had authority under Indiana Code section 31-15-7-3 to revoke maintenance, the evidence supports its findings, and its findings support its judgment that Anne’s finances had not changed so substantially that revocation was warranted. Because we affirm the trial court as to maintenance, we likewise affirm its award of attorney fees.
Dickson, Rucker, David, and Massa, JJ., concur.