Rush, C.J.
In Indiana, there are two rules under which a person can recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress. One of these—the bystander rule—requires, in part, that the person claiming emotional trauma meet certain “circumstantial” factors, which this Court has previously held are questions of law. Specifically, under our precedent, the claimant must demonstrate that the scene viewed was essentially as it was at the time of the incident, that the victim was in essentially the same condition as immediately following the incident, and that the claimant was not informed of the incident before coming upon the scene. Meeting these factors ensures that the claimant can establish sufficient “direct involvement” with the incident to permit emotional distress recovery.
Here, after watching a news story about a fatal car crash, a father drove to the scene of the accident, fearing his son was involved. By the time he arrived, the unsuccessful resuscitation efforts had ended, and the son’s body had been moved and covered with a white sheet so that no signs of injury were visible. Given these undisputed facts, we hold, in accordance with Smith v. Toney, 862 N.E.2d 656 (Ind. 2007), that as a matter of law, the father cannot recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress—despite his undoubtedly genuine grief and shock—because none of the three circumstantial factors were met. Accordingly, we affirm summary judgment in favor of the negligent driver.
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Our “bystander rule”—a fairly recent development in Indiana law—allows recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress if a claimant can establish sufficient “direct involvement” with the incident. “Direct involvement” involves certain temporal and circumstantial factors. The temporal factor requires that the claimant be at the scene of the incident when it occurs or arrive soon after; the circumstantial factors require both the scene and victim to be in the same condition as immediately following the incident and the claimant to have not been informed of the incident before coming upon the scene. Without these requirements, an emotional distress claim fails as a matter of law.
Although the present case deals with a fairly straightforward application of this Court’s precedent, it is set against a backdrop of complex and sensitive policy issues. Examining the history of the “bystander rule” and inquiring whether our precedent is in need of reconsideration are necessary steps to aid us in reaching our decision today.
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Ultimately, after examining other jurisdictions’ approaches, we conclude that we should not change or further expand our precedent. Bystander claims often present fact patterns involving close relatives and horrific injuries, and we recognize that under certain circumstances, bright-line rules may disallow recovery for genuine emotional trauma. Thus, employing a less restrictive foreseeability approach that would expand recovery for those who suffer such distress would initially appear desirable. But we believe this approach is fraught with problems:
[R]eliance on foreseeability of injury . . . is not adequate when the damages sought are for an intangible injury. In order to avoid limitless liability out of all proportion to the degree of a defendant’s negligence, and against which it is impossible to insure without imposing unacceptable costs on those among whom the risk is spread, the right to recover for negligently caused emotional distress must be limited.
Thing, 771 P.2d at 826–27.
In our view, the requirements we have crafted to pursue a successful bystander claim—and making those requirements questions of law—appropriately address the various public policy concerns this particular tort implicates. In other words, we believe that Indiana’s bystander rule strikes the appropriate balance between allowing authentic claims to proceed while also curbing the real issues of open-ended liability, fraudulent claims, and the ubiquity of this type of injury. Over the years, this Court has expanded the class of persons who may seek emotional distress recovery, but any further expansion would be too likely to raise the amalgam of policy problems we seek to avoid.
Adhering to the bystander rule as established by our precedent serves another important purpose. The doctrine of stare decisis is a “maxim of judicial restraint supported by compelling policy reasons of predictability.” Snyder v. King, 958 N.E.2d 764, 776 (Ind. 2011). And under this doctrine, “a rule which has been deliberately declared should not be disturbed by the same court absent urgent reasons and a clear manifestation of error.” Id. (quoting Marsillett v. State, 495 N.E.2d 699, 704–05 (Ind. 1986)). Accordingly, Groves and Smith remain good law.
III. As a Matter of Law, Clifton Did Not Meet the Bystander Rule’s Three Circumstantial Factors.
On direct appeal, Clifton argued that he satisfied Smith’s temporal and circumstantial requirements. [Footnote omitted.] He contended that he arrived minutes after the incident, that Darryl’s body and the accident scene had been unchanged before he saw them, and that it was undisputed that he did not know that Darryl had been killed in the crash prior to arriving.
After noting Smith’s holding that the temporal and circumstantial requirements were questions of law, the Court of Appeals pinpointed the relevant question as “whether the circumstances surrounding Clifton’s coming on the scene of Darryl’s death satisfies the proximity requirement of the bystander rule.” Clifton, 20 N.E.3d at 598–99. While that is indeed the relevant question, we reach a different answer.
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Here, the facts reveal that both the scene and Darryl’s body were materially changed before Clifton arrived. Witnesses moved Darryl’s body, which was upright on his motorbike after the collision, and laid him flat on the pavement. And, after resuscitation efforts failed, emergency personnel covered the body so that no signs of trauma were visible. Although Clifton may have arrived to the scene in a fairly short amount of time after Darryl’s death, Clifton did not experience the “uninterrupted flow of events” following the collision, i.e., before there were significant changes to both the scene and Darryl’s body. Or, to state it another way, Clifton did not have the sudden sensory experience necessary to establish direct involvement. Accordingly, in line with our precedent, as a matter of law, Clifton did not view the “gruesome aftermath” of the incident.
This is not to trivialize emotional trauma that occurs after either the scene or a victim’s condition has materially changed. As demonstrated by this particular case, genuine emotional distress can certainly occur even after the “gruesome aftermath” of an accident has passed. But the important policy reasons undergirding our bystander test are key considerations, and so we have drawn parameters in defining who may recover. When we decided both Groves and Smith, we were well aware that emotional trauma would still befall an immediate family member who arrived to an accident scene after the victim or scene had materially changed. But to curb the issues of open-ended liability and the ubiquity of this type of injury, we had to strike a balance and establish boundaries. As we stressed in Smith: “‘Bystander’ claims are not meant to compensate every emotional trauma.” 862 N.E.2d at 663. “Rather they are limited to those that arise from the shock of experiencing the traumatic event.” Id. (emphasis added).
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In the present case, Clifton was informed of the incident before arriving to the crash scene. When the 12:00 news aired, Clifton learned of a fatal motorbike accident that occurred along a route that Darryl frequented. Although Clifton was not sure the victim was Darryl, as the news did not provide details, Clifton “had a very bad feeling” that prompted him to voluntarily drive to the scene. Of course, this emotional trauma escalated when Clifton’s worst fears were eventually confirmed—that Darryl was, in fact, the crash victim. But it is undisputed that Clifton’s emotional distress began as he was watching television—and emotional trauma triggered by a news story of an accident is distinct from sudden shock that arises when one unwittingly comes upon a scene of an accident. Thus, as a matter of law, Clifton was informed of the incident indirectly before his arrival to the crash site. [Footnote omitted.]
Again, we must stress that major public policy concerns dictate that we draw bright lines, especially in terms of this particular tort. To allow a claimant to recover under a bystander theory when his or her emotional distress begins as a result of seeing a news story or the like would result in virtually limitless litigation. Our quickly evolving state of social media and instantaneous news coverage further underscores the importance of setting parameters for this tort. We are at a point in time when people are often subjected to seeing live, streaming footage—on high-definition televisions, smart phones, or other devices—of emergencies possibly involving their immediate beloved relatives. There must be a point at which a defendant’s exposure to liability for negligent infliction of emotional distress ends—not to diminish real anguish, but simply because pragmatism demands that the line be drawn somewhere. And our precedent has drawn that line by setting out straightforward limits for recovery under this tort.
Conclusion
The undisputed facts demonstrate that Clifton did not meet the circumstantial factors under the bystander test—both the scene and victim were significantly changed before he arrived at the accident, and he had also been informed of the incident indirectly before coming upon it. Accordingly, as a matter of law, Clifton is unable to recover emotional distress damages, and McCammack is entitled to summary judgment.
We affirm the trial court.
Dickson, Rucker, David, and Massa, JJ., concur