Rush, C.J.
Three years after a final judgment foreclosing Plaintiff’s judgment lien—and six years after the suit began—a successor mortgagee moved to intervene to assert its interest in the foreclosed property. We hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to intervene as untimely because Plaintiff’s lis pendens notice, filed at the beginning of the suit, provided constructive notice of the suit. That notice was valid because it was based on an enforceable, unrecorded judgment lien, and Plaintiff’s action to foreclose its judgment lien was an in rem real estate action. We therefore affirm denial of the mortgagee’s motion to intervene.
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JPMorgan’s motion to intervene as a matter of right is governed by T.R. 24(A), which states that trial courts “shall” grant a motion to intervene “when a statute confers an unconditional right to intervene,” Trial R. 24(A)(1), or if the intervenor “shows (1) an interest in property which is the subject of the action, (2) that disposition of the action may practically impair that interest, and (3) that no existing party is adequately representing the moving party’s interest.” Citimortgage, 975 N.E.2d at 812 (citing Trial R. 24(A)(2)).
But intervention as a matter of right “shall” be granted only “[u]pon timely motion.” T.R. 24(A) (emphasis added). And after entry of final judgment, our trial rules go a step further to state that intervention “may be allowed” by the trial court—the word “shall” no longer applies. See Trial R. 24(C) (emphasis added). Timely intervention serves two goals: first, it prevents prejudice to the existing parties who have spent time and energy litigating a matter without regard to the intervenor’s interests. Citimortgage, 975 N.E.2d at 815–16. Second, it preserves the orderly process of the courts, a process that must be predictable, expedient, and economical. Id. Timeliness is primarily a shield that protects the existing parties and the courts, not a sword “to sanction would-be intervenors who are tardy in making their application.’” Id. at 816 (quoting Bryant, 166 Ind. App. at 101, 334 N.E.2d at 735).
Accordingly, JPMorgan bears the burden of showing that the trial court abused its discretion in not finding extraordinary and unusual circumstances to justify its attempt to intervene three years after the foreclosure order and six years after the filing of the suit. See id. We have found such circumstances in past foreclosures when plaintiffs fail to provide intervenors with notice of the suit. See id. JPMorgan now argues that it similarly lacked notice, so that the trial court abused its dis-cretion in denying its motion. But the trial court found, and Claybridge argues, that JPMorgan did have constructive notice—the lis pendens notice Claybridge filed six years before, and on the same day as the foreclosure.
Thus, to resolve the issue of timeliness, we need to determine whether JPMorgan had constructive notice of foreclosure by way of a valid lis pendens notice. We agree with the trial court and Claybridge that the lis pendens notice was valid and gave constructive notice to the world because Claybridge (1) had an unrecorded judgment lien and (2) sought to enforce an in rem real estate interest. We therefore affirm the trial court’s denial of JPMorgan’s motion to intervene.
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All that parties need in order to file a lis pendens under the plain meaning of the statute is (1) an unrecorded lien, (2) upon real estate. The statute unambiguously applies to “any lien upon . . . real estate” that is “not founded upon . . . a judgment of record in the county in which the real estate is located,” I.C. § 32-30-11-3(a)(3)(B) (emphases added). In this way, filing the lis pendens notice “provide[s] machinery whereby a person with an in rem claim to property which is not otherwise recorded or perfected may put his claim upon the public records, so that third persons dealing with the defendant . . . will have constructive notice of it.” Curry v. Orwig, 429 N.E.2d 268, 272–73 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981) (quoting 4 W. Harvey and R. B. Townsend, Indiana Practice § 63.1 B at 340 (1971)).
II. Claybridge Complied with the Lis Pendens Statute and Thereby Provided Constructive Notice of its Foreclosure Action.
JPMorgan contends that Claybridge’s lis pendens notice is invalid and failed to give constructive notice of its suit because Claybridge had no “lien . . . upon real estate” to enforce—but instead had only a personal judgment against Deborah. Because the 2007 personal judgment against Deborah was never docketed, JPMorgan reasons that under the judgment lien statute, it never became enforceable as a lien against JPMorgan’s interest in the Real Estate. JPMorgan concedes that it would not have a case if the Clerk had recorded the judgment lien. But without an enforceable lien, it insists that all Claybridge had was a personal judgment, and not a real estate interest that justifies a lis pendens filing.
We disagree. Although the 2007 personal judgment was unrecorded, Claybridge had an enforceable judgment lien on Deborah’s property under longstanding precedent that a judgment always constitutes a lien “[a]s between the immediate parties to the judgment,” Berry v. Reed, 73 Ind. 235, 239 (Ind. 1881)—which the Court of Appeals recognized and properly applied in an earlier appeal. Walton, 2011 WL 240179, at *4. Indeed, the fact that the lien is unrecorded is the very reason that the lis pendens statute applies—since only liens “not founded upon . . . a judgment of record” warrant a lis pendens filing. I.C. § 32-30-11-3(a)(3)(B) (emphasis added). Finally, Claybridge’s judgment lien was an in rem real estate interest—entirely separate from its underlying personal judgment—that served as a legitimate basis for filing the lis pendens notice. The valid lis pendens notice therefore gave JPMorgan constructive notice of the suit, and its motion to intervene six years later was untimely.
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Conclusion
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying JPMorgan’s post-judgment motion to intervene as untimely because Claybridge’s lis pendens notice gave JPMorgan constructive notice of the foreclosure. The lis pendens notice was valid because it was filed to enforce a valid, unrecorded judgment lien as to Deborah—regardless of whether the lien applied to JPMorgan. Moreover, Claybridge’s foreclosure action was an in rem, real estate action, not a personal action that would otherwise disqualify the lis pendens filing. We affirm the trial court’s denial of JPMorgan’s motion to intervene.
Dickson, Rucker, David, and Massa, JJ., concur.