Mathias, J.
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On January 23, 2014, after checking the pseudoephedrine purchase logs of local drug stores, Perry County chief deputy sheriff Daymion Marsh (“Deputy Marsh”) learned that Stevens, along with several other people, had made suspicious purchases of pseudoephedrine that had “caused a scene” of some sort the day before at Werner Drug Store in Tell City, Indiana. [Record citations omitted throughout.] Deputy Marsh performed criminal history checks on the purchasers using the Indiana Data and Communication System (“IDACS”). The results of the check revealed that Stevens’s criminal history included a Florida conviction labeled in IDACS as “Poss Meth W Intent to Sell Manufacture Deliver.”
Indiana State Police Trooper Howard Lytton (“Trooper Lytton”) also reviewed Stevens’s criminal history record. Based on the information in the record, Deputy Marsh and Trooper Lytton believed it was illegal for Stevens to purchase pseudoephedrine pursuant to Indiana Code section 35-48-4- 14.5(h)(1)(a), which makes it a Class D felony for a person convicted of dealing in methamphetamine to knowingly or intentionally possess pseudoephedrine. [Defendant was arrested, then charged with various drug offenses when post-arrest investigation found drugs and paraphernalia in his possession and at his home.]
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Stevens filed a motion to suppress on March 21, 2014, arguing no probable cause justified his arrest at Werner Drug Store because the Florida conviction that served as the basis for the arrest was in fact not for dealing methamphetamine but instead for dealing Alprazolam, a prescription medication more commonly known as Xanax. He argued that, as a result of his illegal arrest, any evidence collected after his arrest … should be suppressed. … On June 6, 2014, the trial court issued an order granting Stevens’s motion and ordering that “all items seized and all statements made by the Defendant” be suppressed. …
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Here, the State argues that because “law enforcement officers had no reason to doubt the accuracy of the criminal history record and the information available to them at the time of Stevens’s arrest,” the fact that Stevens’s criminal history record incorrectly indicated that he had a prior conviction for dealing in methamphetamine does not negate the existence of probable cause to arrest Stevens when he attempted to buy pseudoephedrine on January 23, 2014. [Record citations omitted throughout.] The State emphasizes that if Stevens had had a conviction within seven years for dealing in methamphetamine, his purchase of pseudoephedrine would have been a Class D felony under Indiana Code section 35-48-4-14.5(h)(1)(A). The State argues that it was reasonable for officers to rely on information generated by IDACS and that “retrospect is not the proper lens in which to view probable cause.”
Stevens, on the other hand, argues that officers should not have merely relied on the criminal history record without conducting further research into the nature of Stevens’s conviction. Citing Florida Statutes Annotated section 893.13, he notes that the actual title of the Florida statute under which Stevens was convicted does not contain any reference to possessing or dealing methamphetamine. [Footnotes omitted.] He contends that before arresting him, officers should have (1) contacted the prosecutor’s office to confirm that the criminal history entry was accurate or (2) accessed the Florida statute online to confirm that Stevens was convicted of a crime involving methamphetamine before arresting him.
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We find Moody [v. State, 448 N.E.2d 660 (Ind. 1983)] to be controlling in this case and conclude that under both the Fourth Amendment and Article 1, Section 11, it was reasonable for law enforcement officers to believe that the information they received from IDACS, namely that Stevens had a prior conviction for dealing in methamphetamine, was accurate. The system is one on which officers regularly rely, and nothing indicates that officers are or should be expected to confirm or research data generated by IDACS, particularly absent any evidence of intentional misconduct with respect to use or maintenance of the system. This reasonable belief was sufficient to provide probable cause to believe that Stevens was committing a crime by attempting to purchase pseudoephedrine. [String citation omitted.]
Therefore, under the unique facts and circumstances before us, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in granting Stevens’s motion to suppress. We accordingly reverse the trial court’s order suppressing the evidence recovered as a result of Stevens’s warrantless arrest and remand this matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Crone, J., and Bradford, J., concur.