Mathias, J.
….
Rose first contends that it was improper for [Teresa] Cataldo to serve on the jury, given her status as an attorney who was the sole candidate for the office of judge of the court in which the trial was taking place. Rose admits that he made no objection at trial to Cataldo serving as a juror. Thus, he failed to properly preserve this issue for appeal. [Citations omitted.]
Rose seeks to avoid this procedural default by claiming that Cataldo serving on the jury amounted to fundamental error.…
….
Rose argues that a possibility exists that he “received a trial in front of a jury of one, or the functional equivalent to a bench trial” because Cataldo sat as a juror…. First, by use of the word “possibility,” Rose effectively concedes that his argument in this regard is mere speculation. [Citation omitted.] More importantly, at the time she sat on the jury, Cataldo had not been elected as judge; she was simply another citizen performing her civic duty to serve on a jury. We therefore reject Rose’s claim that he effectively received a bench trial.
To the extent that Cataldo was an attorney, she testified during voir dire that, despite her familiarity with the attorneys in the case, she would be able to act fair and impartially as a juror. Rose does not refer us to, and we are not aware of, any rule, statute, or authority that would disqualify an attorney or a judge to serve as a juror. Cf. Ind. Code § 33-28-5-18 (listing disqualifications for jury service).
Rose also argues that Cataldo should not have served on the jury because she had previously represented [the victim]’s mother in an unrelated matter. This, however, occurred five years before the current trial, and Cataldo testified that she had no recollection of that case and that it would not affect her ability to act as an impartial juror. The trial judge, and indeed Rose’s trial counsel, credited Cataldo’s statements, and we cannot say that this decision, which resulted in Cataldo serving on the jury, had such an undeniable and substantial effect on the jury’s decision that a fair trial was impossible.
….
Affirmed….
May, J., and Robb, J., concur.
….
Rose first contends that it was improper for [Teresa] Cataldo to serve on the jury, given her status as an attorney who was the sole candidate for the office of judge of the court in which the trial was taking place. Rose admits that he made no objection at trial to Cataldo serving as a juror. Thus, he failed to properly preserve this issue for appeal. [Citations omitted.]
Rose seeks to avoid this procedural default by claiming that Cataldo serving on the jury amounted to fundamental error.…
….
Rose argues that a possibility exists that he “received a trial in front of a jury of one, or the functional equivalent to a bench trial” because Cataldo sat as a juror…. First, by use of the word “possibility,” Rose effectively concedes that his argument in this regard is mere speculation. [Citation omitted.] More importantly, at the time she sat on the jury, Cataldo had not been elected as judge; she was simply another citizen performing her civic duty to serve on a jury. We therefore reject Rose’s claim that he effectively received a bench trial.
To the extent that Cataldo was an attorney, she testified during voir dire that, despite her familiarity with the attorneys in the case, she would be able to act fair and impartially as a juror. Rose does not refer us to, and we are not aware of, any rule, statute, or authority that would disqualify an attorney or a judge to serve as a juror. Cf. Ind. Code § 33-28-5-18 (listing disqualifications for jury service).
Rose also argues that Cataldo should not have served on the jury because she had previously represented [the victim]’s mother in an unrelated matter. This, however, occurred five years before the current trial, and Cataldo testified that she had no recollection of that case and that it would not affect her ability to act as an impartial juror. The trial judge, and indeed Rose’s trial counsel, credited Cataldo’s statements, and we cannot say that this decision, which resulted in Cataldo serving on the jury, had such an undeniable and substantial effect on the jury’s decision that a fair trial was impossible.
….
Affirmed….
May, J., and Robb, J., concur.