Rush. C.J.
Every Child in Need of Services (CHINS) proceeding has the potential to interfere with parents’ rights in the upbringing of their children—and so the parents’ due process rights, including the right to an unbiased and uncoercive forum, are paramount. But the judicial conduct in this case deprived Father of those rights. After making several derogatory remarks over the course of two hearings about the parties and the nature of their dispute, the trial court pressured Father to waive his right to a fact-finding hearing and instead admit that his daughter was a CHINS. Though Father did not object to the trial court’s statements, their combined effect was sufficiently coercive to constitute fundamental error. We therefore reverse the CHINS adjudication.
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Likewise here, we conclude the cumulative effect of the trial court’s comments breached its “duty to remain impartial and refrain from making unnecessary comments or remarks,” id., such that Father was coerced into admitting that J.K. was a CHINS—a matter he had firmly contested just moments earlier. The court began the first hearing by complaining that the dispute made “[m]y hair hurt[].” As the parties tried to reach consensus on a solution, the court told them, “All I want to know is does [Father] admit [that J.K. is a CHINS] or are we trying it?” And immediately there-after, instead of letting Father “call [his] first witness” as the court had instructed, it told the parties that their dispute was “ridiculous,” “retarded,” indicative of “stupidity,” “just nuts,” and otherwise “not what this Court is for,” and stated that it would “warn” (rather than merely instruct or advise) the appointed mediator. Those remarks strongly suggested to the parties they would not receive a “fair trial before an impartial judge.” Harrington, 584 N.E.2d at 561; Abernathy, 524 N.E.2d at 13.
The second hearing, after mediation failed, confirmed that impression. Once the parties had been identified for the record, DCS informed the court that there arose “a little bit of an issue with this case,” to which the trial court sarcastically responded, “Imagine that.” And shortly thereafter, the court called the parties “knuckleheads” for failing to resolve their dispute in mediation. All of this culminated in the court announcing that it was “adjudicating [J.K.] as a child in need of services” without having received any sworn testimony. When Father’s counsel objected, the court persuaded Father to change his mind by stating that he would otherwise “find [his] butt finding a new job” if he wanted to “play that game,” and expressing frustration at the time of day. Then, and only then, did Father relent and say—contrary to his counsel’s statements moments earlier—“That’s fine[,] she’s . . . a child in need of services.”
DCS argues that the trial court “did not demonstrate any actual bias or prejudice against Father.” Instead, in its view, the court urging Father to waive fact-finding was merely a neutral expla-nation that busing services for J.K., which would remedy his inability to provide transportation for her and permit her to remain at the same high school, could be provided only if she were in a court-ordered placement. We disagree.
Viewed in isolation, DCS’s characterization could be plausible. But we must consider the “cumulative effect” of a court’s comments, because even relatively minor remarks can compound into prejudice. E.g., Everling, 929 N.E.2d at 1290–91 (finding prejudice based on cumulative effect of court’s comments); Stellwag v. State, 854 N.E.2d 64, 69 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (same), and the full context can mitigate comments that seemed damaging in isolation, e.g., Elbert v. Elbert, 579 N.E.2d 102, 115 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (Baker, J., concurring) (plurality opinion) (holding that “in their totality,” judge’s comments did not impermissibly impose religious requirement for child custody). Here, the prejudicial effect of the statements compounded with repetition through two hearings. Moreover, the court’s repeated implication of being unreceptive and hostile to the parties came to a head when it told Father, “If I were you I’d waive fact-finding” or else “find your butt finding a new job,” unless he wanted to “play that game” of having a contested hearing. The cumulative effect of the trial court’s comments and demeanor had a direct impact on Father accepting the court’s leading suggestion to “waive fact-finding.” [Footnote omitted.] Such coercion is fundamental error, and we reverse J.K.’s adjudication as a CHINS accordingly.
Conclusion
Because the trial court’s remarks and conduct, in their cumulative effect, breached the court’s duty of impartiality and amounted to coercion of Father, we reverse the CHINS adjudication. [Footnote omitted.]
Dickson, Rucker, and David, JJ.,concur.
Massa, J., concurs in result.