Rush, C.J.
After a fire, a dentist’s office discovered that the contents coverage of its insurance policy— a policy it had maintained for over thirty years—was inadequate to cover the loss. The insurance agent and the insured now dispute whether their long-term relationship was a special relationship that obligated the agent to advise the insured about its coverage. The parties also dispute whether their past dealings show a “meeting of the minds” on an implied contract, requiring the agent to procure a policy that would cover all losses to office contents.
On summary judgment review, we hold that the designated evidence supports conflicting inferences on whether the parties enjoyed a special relationship that created a duty to advise. As for the implied contract to procure full coverage, we hold that the record does not show any discussion between the parties on the matter, much less a meeting of the minds. We therefore reverse in part and affirm in part the trial court’s order granting partial summary judgment.
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Although IRD and Laven have a lengthy relationship, none of the designated evidence suggests that IRD ever requested “full coverage.” Every increase in the policy limit came as a result of IRD requesting discrete increases of coverage and Laven subsequently procuring those increases. Thus, the parties’ course of dealings provides no basis from which to infer an implied contract for Laven to procure full coverage. Nor can IRD identify a single conversation or interac-tion with Laven from which we could identify the five critical elements necessary to infer a meet-ing of the minds on full coverage. Stockberger, 182 Ind. App. at 577, 395 N.E.2d at 1279. Accord-ingly, we affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment on this issue.
Conclusion
The designated evidence here paints an inconclusive picture regarding the nature of Laven’s and IRD’s relationship. Thus, genuine issues of material fact remain regarding the existence of a special relationship, and consequently a duty to advise. But the record is clear that Laven had no duty to procure full coverage, because there is no evidence of any discussion of an implied contract for Laven to procure full coverage for IRD’s office contents, much less a meeting of the minds.
We therefore reverse summary judgment regarding Laven’s duty to advise but affirm summary judgment against IRD regarding Laven’s contractual duty to procure full coverage. On remand, the parties may continue to litigate Laven’s duty to advise; Laven’s alleged contractual duty to procure $350,000 in office contents coverage; and ProAssurance’s vicarious liability for Laven’s alleged wrongdoing.
Dickson, Rucker, David, and Massa, JJ., concur.