Mathias, J.
The Indiana Bureau of Motor Vehicles (“BMV”) appeals the order of the Marshall Superior Court granting a petition for judicial review filed by Jennifer M. Gurtner (“Gurtner”) after her license was suspended for failure to provide proof of financial responsibility following an automobile accident. On appeal, the BMV claims that the trial court was without authority to grant the petition because the controlling statute provides the trial court with no discretion to overturn the suspension. Concluding that Gurtner did not adequately avail herself of the available statutory remedies, we reverse.
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As set forth above, Indiana Code section 9-25-6-3 requires the BMV to suspend the license of a person who, regardless of fault, cannot provide proof of financial responsibility at the time of an accident. This much Gurtner admits. She claims, however, that she was denied due process because she was not afforded an opportunity to explain to the BMV that her license should not be suspended because the failure to maintain insurance coverage on her vehicle was not her fault.
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Here, the BMV suspended Gurtner’s license before the petition for judicial review could be heard. However, Gurtner failed to request any stay of the suspension of her license. Perhaps more importantly, neither did she request a “hardship” license. At the time Gurtner’s suspension was pending, Indiana Code section 9-24-15-1(1)3 provided that a trial court could grant a hardship license to an individual who failed to provide proof of financial responsibility after receiving a request for such proof following an accident “if the individual shows by a preponderance of the evidence that the failure to maintain financial responsibility was inadvertent.” Had Gurtner availed herself of this provision, she could have demonstrated that her failure to maintain her financial responsibility was inadvertent and thereby have been able to maintain some, or all, of her driving privileges. In other words, a statutory method was available for Gurtner to present her claim — via a request for a hardship license. Yet Gurtner failed to avail herself of this available statutory method. Under these facts and circumstances, we cannot say that Gurtner was denied procedural due process. [Footnote omitted.]
Conclusion
This case sets forth facts that were not really contemplated by the licensure statutes in effect at the time. Gurtner and the trial judge involved did the best they could do under unusual circumstances. That said, Gurtner failed to take advantage of the existing statutory remedies that would have provided her with an opportunity to explain why her failure to maintain financial responsibility was not her fault. Accordingly, we cannot say that the suspension of her license was accomplished without adequate due process.
Reversed.
Najam, J., and Bradford, J., concur.