Rush, C.J.
Even when a plaintiff proves a predicate crime under the Crime Victims Relief Act (CVRA), the trial court has discretion not to award exemplary damages when it thinks the conduct is not egregious enough to warrant punishment. And when a plaintiff pleads several alternative grounds for relief, the trial court has similar discretion not to impose CVRA liability at all, even when it awards compensatory damages under a different theory. Accordingly, the trial court here acted within its discretion to compensate Plaintiffs for their common-law damages, while also refusing to award attorney fees or exemplary damages under the CVRA. We granted transfer to clarify that point and reiterate several principles about CVRA liability. We affirm the trial court, though for different reasons than the Court of Appeals.
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We therefore reject the Wysockis’ invitation to adopt a bright-line rule imposing CVRA liability in all cases involving a knowing misrepresentation on a Sales Disclosure Form—at least where the claimants plead other grounds for liability in the alternative. Plaintiffs are free to choose, by their pleadings, to place all their eggs in the CVRA basket and take their chances on the fact-finder’s assessment of criminality in exchange for the assurance of recovering costs and attorney fees if they prevail. But they are also free, as here, to plead other remedies in the alternative to the CVRA to hedge against being shut-out from compensatory damages if the trial court is reluctant to impose quasi-criminal liability. In those circumstances, the trial court has discretion over which remedies to award. Accordingly, the trial court was within its discretion to award compensatory damages for common-law fraudulent misrepresentation, while declining relief under the Wysockis’ alternative CVRA theory.
II. A CVRA Claim Requires Proving the Elements of a Criminal Offense, But Only by the Civil Preponderance Standard; and It Does Not Depend on Whether the Defendant Has Been Charged with or Convicted of any Criminal Offense.
The Court of Appeals also stated that the CVRA could not apply because the underlying offense of criminal deception, “as with all crimes, [requires] the State . . . to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt,” and “because the Johnsons were not charged with [fraud] . . . , much less convicted of it in a court of law.” Wysocki, 4 N.E.3d at 1223. But as we recently reiterated, “An actual criminal conviction is not required for recovery [under the CVRA]; a claimant merely must prove each element of the underlying crime by a preponderance of the evidence.” Kesling v. Hubler Nissan, Inc., 997 N.E.2d 327, 334 (Ind. 2013) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). See also Klinker v. First Merchs. Bank, N.A., 964 N.E.2d 190, 193 (Ind. 2012) (same); White, 555 N.E.2d at 456 (construing predecessor statute and concluding that “[u]nder this unique statute, a criminal conviction is not a condition precedent to recovery. The claimant need only prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the criminal act was committed by the defendant.” (internal citation omitted)); Obremski v. Henderson, 497 N.E.2d 909, 911 (Ind. 1986) (construing predecessor statute and concluding that “[t]he appropriate standard is preponderance of the evidence.”). And just as no conviction is required, nothing in the statute suggests that a criminal charge is necessary, either. Though we agree with the Court of Appeals that denial of relief under the CVRA should be affirmed, we reiterate that CVRA liability is civil, not criminal, and does not require criminal charges or proof beyond reasonable doubt.
Conclusion
A knowing misrepresentation on a Sales Disclosure Form is an intentional tort. But not every intentional tort is necessarily “so heinous as to require exemplary damages,” Citizens Nat. Bank, 637 N.E.2d at 195, or as to warrant quasi-criminal CVRA liability at all. In other words, not every intentional tortfeasor is a criminal. CVRA liability does not depend on whether the tortfeasor has been charged with or convicted of the CVRA predicate offense, nor even solely on the elements of the CVRA predicate offense. Instead, liability is also a matter of the factfinder’s discretionary judgment of whether the defendant is criminally culpable. When a court does impose CVRA liability, an award of costs and reasonable attorney fees is mandatory by the terms of the statute, even though additional exemplary damages remain discretionary. But when given a choice, the court need not impose CVRA liability when it believes ordinary tort liability will do. The trial court acted well within its discretion to make that judgment in this case, and we affirm its judgment.
Dickson, Rucker, David, and Massa, JJ., concur.