Mathias, J.
Marley claims that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the recent changes to the Indiana criminal code that have, under certain circumstances, notably decreased the sentences for drug offenses. Marley does not claim that the new criminal code statutes apply directly to his conviction and sentence; he claims instead that we should consider the public policy set forth in the new criminal code in determining whether his sentence is inappropriate.
Under the version of the dealing statue in effect prior to July 1, 2014, which Marley admits is applicable to his offense, dealing in a Schedule I, II, or III controlled substance was a Class B felony, with a sentencing range of six to twenty years. Ind. Code § 35-48-4-2(a) (2013). [Footnote omitted.] Under the new version of the dealing statute, which became effective July 1, 2014, dealing in a Schedule I, II, or III controlled substance is a Level 6 felony, with a sentencing range of six months to one and one-half years. Ind. Code § 35-48-4-2(a) (2014). Proof of dealing in larger amounts [footnote omitted] can elevate this crime up to a Level 2 felony. Ind. Code § 35-48-4-2(b) (2014). The sentencing range for a Level 2 felony is ten to thirty years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-4.5 (2014). Marley argues that we should consider this reduction in the penalties for dealing in a controlled substance when addressing whether his sentence is appropriate.
Generally speaking, the sentencing statutes in effect at the time the defendant committed the offense govern the defendant’s sentence. Barber v. State, 863 N.E.2d 1199, 1209 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). However, the doctrine of amelioration provides an exception to this general rule where a defendant who is sentenced after the effective date of a statute providing for more lenient sentencing is entitled to be sentenced pursuant to that statute rather than the sentencing statute in effect at the time of the commission or conviction of the crime. Id. Notably, the doctrine of amelioration does not apply where the legislature, in a specific saving clause, expressly states an intention that crimes committed before the effective date of the ameliorative amendment should be prosecuted under prior law. Turner v. State, 870 N.E.2d 1083, 1087 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).
Here, the General Assembly, in enacting the new criminal code, also enacted savings clauses. Specifically, both Indiana Code section 1-1-5.5-21 and section 1-1-5.5-22 state that the new criminal code “does not affect: (1) penalties incurred; (2) crimes committed; or (3) proceedings begun” before the effective date of the new criminal code sections, i.e., July 1, 2014. These sections also provide that “Those penalties, crimes, and proceedings continue and shall be imposed and enforced under prior law as if [the new criminal code] had not been enacted.” Id. And, in no uncertain terms, these sections state: “The general assembly does not intend the doctrine of amelioration (see Vicory v. State, 400 N.E.2d 1380 (Ind. 1980)) to apply to any SECTION [of the new criminal code].” Id.
It is abundantly clear from these statutes that the General Assembly intended the new criminal code to have no effect on criminal proceedings for offenses committed prior to the enactment of the new code. We think this is true with regard to considering the appropriateness of a sentence under Appellate Rule 7(B); we are to proceed as if the new criminal code had not been enacted. We therefore decline to take into consideration the lesser penalties of the new criminal code in addressing the appropriateness of Marley’s sentence. Instead, we consider what Appellate Rule 7(B) requires us to consider: the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.
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Conclusion
Because of the clear, unambiguous language of the savings clause statutes, we decline to take into consideration the lesser penalties of the new criminal code when addressing the appropriateness of Marley’s sentence. Upon considering the nature of the offense and the character of the offender, we are unable to say that Marley’s sentence of ten years executed and two years suspended is inappropriate.
Affirmed.
RILEY, J., and CRONE, J., concur.