Rush, C.J.
Under Indiana Trial Rule 56, summary judgment is precluded by any “genuine” issue of material fact—that is, any issue requiring the trier of fact to resolve the parties’ differing accounts of the truth. Merely resting on the pleadings will not permit the non-movant to raise such an issue, but a competent affidavit will. Here, Defendant’s affidavit was self-serving and none too detailed—but it was competent, and it contradicted the State’s designated evidence on a material fact. It was therefore sufficient to preclude summary judgment, regardless of whether Defendant would likely prevail at trial. We accordingly reverse the trial court.
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Thus, even though Defendant’s designated evidence was rather thin, it was enough to preclude summary judgment for the State. As Deuitch hinted, the real probative value of an affidavit like Defendant’s may be minimal, since an unscrupulous litigant could defeat summary judgment merely by filing a perjurous affidavit. 746 N.E.2d at 999–1000. But we have always considered an oath, subject to penalties for perjury, to be an adequate deterrent against false testimony—hence the Rule 56(C) requirement to designate evidence, and not merely rest on unsworn pleadings. Moreover, Trial Rule 56(G) protects the integrity of the summary judgment process by providing an additional deterrent: monetary liability for the opposing party’s costs and attorney fees resulting from an affidavit “presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay,” plus the prospect of contempt against “any offending party or attorney” (emphasis added). Finally, Defendant’s trial testimony may provide additional details to flesh out his cursory affidavit (though if so, it would have been wise to include them in the affidavit). In either event, existing procedural safeguards are adequate to balance the integrity of summary judgment against our concern for not prematurely closing the courthouse doors to the non-moving party, without raising the non-movant’s burden beyond what our precedent has long required.
Conclusion
“Summary judgment should not be granted when it is necessary to weigh the evidence.” Bochnowski v. Peoples Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 571 N.E.2d 282, 285 (Ind. 1991). Because Defendant designated competent evidence in response to the State’s motion for summary judgment, weighing it—no matter how decisively the scales may seem to tip—was a matter for trial, not summary judgment. The trial court’s judgment is therefore reversed, and we remand this matter with instructions to deny the State’s motion for summary judgment.
Dickson, Rucker, David, and Massa, JJ., concur.