Rush, J.
Randy L. Knapp appeals his conviction for murdering Stacey Lawson and his sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole (“LWOP”). He challenges the admission of crime scene photographs and an expert witness’s reliance on those photographs, the denial of his motion for mistrial, and the preliminary jury instructions in the penalty phase of his trial. He also contends that his LWOP sentence is supported by insufficient evidence, unconstitutionally based on uncharged, non-statutory aggravators, and either unconstitutionally disproportionate or inappropriate under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B). We affirm in all respects.
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Defendant first argues that there was insufficient foundation to admit six crime-scene photos (Exhibits 92, 93, and 97, plus magnified portions of each marked 92A, 93A, and 97A) into evidence through Dr. Kohr’s testimony. Because this issue was properly preserved by trial objection, we review it under the ordinary standard for admission of photographic evidence: abuse of discretion. Pruitt v. State, 834 N.E.2d 90, 117 (Ind. 2005), reh’g denied. Specifically, Defendant asserts that the State failed to sufficiently establish when the photos were taken—the basic fact from which Dr. Kohr formed his final forensic opinion of Lawson’s time of death. We find that their time and date were adequately demonstrated, with any remaining uncertainty being only a matter of their weight and not their admissibility.
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Defendant also argues that because of uncertainty about when the photos were taken, they were too unreliable for Dr. Kohr to rely on in forming his opinion—an issue raised for the first time on appeal, and therefore reviewable only for fundamental error. But it is well settled that experts may rely on evidence of a type reasonably relied upon in their field of expertise, regardless of its admissibility. Evid. R. 703. Here, it was surely reasonable for Dr. Kohr to rely on the photos’ date and time as accurate enough for the assessment he’d been asked to make, since that detail had been established “to a relative certainty” in demonstrating their “competency and authenticity” as discussed above. His reliance on those photos was entirely permissible.
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Next, Defendant asserts fundamental error (again, there was no objection at trial) in the preliminary jury instructions on reasonable doubt for the penalty phase, because instead of reciting that the State had to prove the charged aggravating circumstance beyond reasonable doubt, it repeated the guilt-phase instruction about the “element[s] of the crime” and Defendant’s “guilt.” Tr. 1393. We review jury instructions “as a whole and in reference to each other,” and “error in a particular instruction will not result in reversal unless the entire jury charge misleads the jury as to the law in the case.” Whitney v. State, 750 N.E.2d 342, 344 (Ind. 2001) (quoting Edgecomb v. State, 673 N.E.2d 1185, 1196 (Ind. 1996), reh’g denied). And under fundamental error review, Defendant must further show the charge was so misleading as to make a fair trial impossible or blatantly violate basic due process. See Clark, 915 N.E.2d at 131. Here, there is no doubt that the challenged instruction was erroneous, but in view of other correct preliminary instructions on the subject, the overall jury charge was not significantly misleading, let alone enough so to establish fundamental error.
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Besides the instructional error addressed above, Defendant raises several issues relating to the substance of his LWOP sentence—that there was insufficient evidence that he was on probation at the time (the only statutory LWOP aggravator the State charged); that the State improperly urged the jury to recommend LWOP based on non-statutory aggravators; that LWOP is “cruel and unusual” or unconstitutionally disproportionate as applied when it is based solely on probationary status for a prior low-level offense; and that LWOP is inappropriate under Appellate Rule 7(B). We address each argument in turn.
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Defendant reasons that the discrepancy about the end-date of his probation leaves reasonable doubt about his probationary status. Appellant’s Br. at 64. We disagree. By the terms of the statute, the State was only required to prove that Defendant was on probation for a felony “at the time the murder was committed,” I.C. § 35-50-2-9(a), (b)(9)(C)—not how much longer thereafter his probation would last. Any discrepancy as to the latter point is immaterial, since there was no dispute about his probationary status on the relevant date. And in any event, a reasonable factfinder could readily conclude that the probation officer’s testimony, backed by the sentencing order, was correct and that the detective’s uncorroborated testimony to the contrary was mistaken. Viewed either way, the evidence was sufficient for a reasonable factfinder to be persuaded beyond reasonable doubt that Defendant was on probation on the day of Lawson’s murder.
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Defendant next argues that the State committed prosecutorial misconduct by inviting the jury to recommend LWOP based on non-statutory aggravators—a practice we have held violates the proportionality clause of Article 1, Section 16 of the Indiana Constitution and constitutes prosecutorial misconduct. On this point as well, he raised no timely trial-level objection and must therefore establish fundamental error to prevail. We find no error, let alone fundamental error.
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In essence, Defendant argues that his non-reporting probation for two Class D felonies was, as a matter of constitutional law, so trivial that using it as the basis for LWOP violates the Eighth Amendment and Article 1, Section 16 of the Indiana Constitution as “grossly disproportionate.” The Eighth Amendment’s bar on “cruel and unusual” punishments has been held to implicitly prohibit certain “grossly disproportionate punishments.” Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 288 (1983). But our Constitution by its terms expressly requires proportionality: “Cruel and unusual punishments shall not be inflicted. All penalties shall be proportioned to the nature of the offense.” We have therefore held that this provision “goes beyond” Eighth Amendment protections, Conner v. State, 626 N.E.2d 803, 806 (Ind. 1993), and permits us “to review the duration of [a] sentence as it is possible for the statute under which [an] appellant is convicted to be constitutional, and yet be unconstitutional as applied . . . in [a] particular instance,” id. (quoting Clark v. State, 561 N.E.2d 759, 765 (Ind. 1990)). We thus begin our analysis with the more-protective State standard.
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In the alternative to his constitutional challenges, Defendant seeks relief under Appellate Rule 7(B), asserting that his sentence is “inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” The 7(B) “appropriateness” inquiry is a discretionary exercise of the appellate court’s judgment, not unlike the trial court’s discretionary sentencing determination. Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1223 (Ind. 2008). On appeal, though, we conduct that review with substantial deference and give “due consideration” to the trial court’s decision—since the “principal role of [our] review is to attempt to leaven the outliers,” Chambers v. State, 989 N.E.2d 1257, 1259 (Ind. 2013) (citing Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1225), and not to achieve a perceived “correct” sentence, Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1225. This review carries out this Court’s general constitutional authority to review and revise sentences under Article 7, § 4 of the Indiana Constitution. Chambers, 989 N.E.2d at 1259.
Applying that standard here, our collective judgment is that LWOP is not inappropriate in light of the nature of Defendant’s offense or his character as an offender. The nature of the offense was calculated, premeditated, and brutal. Far from a spur-of-the-moment crime of opportunity, Defendant had been seeking out Lawson for the two weeks since Sims’ suicide. Upon finding her, he announced that he “might beat her f—kin’ brains out,” lured her into the car on false pretenses, dragged her into the woods behind her own brother’s gravesite, and then did just what he said he would do, smashing her head with a force normally associated with car crashes. And he did so at her brother’s own gravesite—effectively desecrating that site for Lawson’s surviving family, who must return to the same spot where their daughter drew her last breath in order to pay their respects to their deceased son. Life without parole is not inappropriate for such an offense.
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Conclusion
For all the foregoing reasons, we affirm Defendant’s conviction for the murder of Stacey Lawson, and his sentence to life imprisonment without possibility of parole.
Dickson, C.J., and Rucker, David, and Massa, JJ., concur.