Rush, J.
Decisions to terminate parental rights are among the most difficult our trial courts are called upon to make. They are also among the most fact-sensitive—so we review them with great deference to the trial courts, recognizing their superior vantage point for weighing the evidence and assessing witness credibility. Because a case that seems close on a “dry record” may have been much more clear-cut in person, we must be careful not to substitute our judgment for the trial court when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence.
We granted transfer to reiterate that caution. Father’s eventual efforts to establish a relation-ship with his children were commendable, and DCS’s family preservation efforts with him could have been stronger. Yet the standard of review requires us to consider only the evidence favorable to the judgment—and in turn, to respect the trial court’s reasonable conclusion that Father’s efforts were both too little in view of his violence and earlier pattern of hostility toward services, and too late in view of the children’s urgent need for permanency after several years in out-of-home placement. The evidence was sufficient to support termination, so we defer to the trial court and affirm its judgment.
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The final question, then—and the one central to this Court’s difference of opinion—is whether Father’s efforts after his release from prison necessarily made the children’s interest in family preservation more compelling than their need for permanency after three years. We agree fully with the dissent that focusing on permanency, standing alone, would impermissibly invert the best-interests inquiry; and we must sadly concur that preservation efforts have too often been extended halfheartedly to non-custodial minority fathers. As both opinions’ reliance on psychological and sociological research illustrates, child-welfare cases often implicate delicate social questions—and just as we have presumed the trial court’s familiarity with research about the effects of domestic violence on children in the household, we expect our child-welfare courts to be equally mindful of the dissent’s crucial concerns. Terminating a fit parent’s relationship with his children fails to advance the State’s parens patriae interest, and gravely and irreparably harms families. That harm would be greater still if it were, even unconsciously, the product of racial bias.
But we perceive no such distortion in this particular case. Children’s vital interests in both preservation and permanency are inherently at odds in TPR cases—all the more so in this case, for the policy reasons the dissent thoughtfully identifies. And while the evidence in TPR cases is often lopsided, it was a much closer call here, because Father’s efforts to form a relationship with his children appear entirely genuine and demonstrate significant progress from his hostility toward services and service providers at the beginning of the case. Yet it was not unreasonable for the trial court to find the countervailing evidence even more compelling—that the children had waited nearly three and a half years to have a permanent home, that Father was still in no position to provide them with that home, that he had not even bonded with them, and that his failure to make progress in regard to his domestic violence did not bode well for his ability to do so in any reasonable amount of additional time.
We recognize that Father’s incarceration played a substantial role in the lengthy delay and his failure to bond with the children—but incarceration alone cannot justify “tolling” a child-welfare case, as Father essentially seeks to do. First, Father cannot contend that those problems were merely a byproduct of imprisonment, when he had had nearly a year before then to engage in services and bond with his children, but failed to do so. And even after his apparent change of heart in prison, he could have notified DCS of his imprisonment, requested services, or at least sent progress reports from his prison programs. For that matter, he could have made at least some effort to communicate with E.M. and El.M., perhaps by sending cards or short letters, or by telephone as they became older—all of which Rowlett illustrates are viable from behind bars, even with children as young as two or three years old.
Still, we acknowledge that for all the reasons the dissent identifies, the evidence here was close, and Father’s admirable efforts after his release from prison could have permitted a denial of TPR. Unlike Rowlett, though, the evidence does not compel denial, either—as it might if this case involved a shorter delay, some efforts by Father to forge a relationship with his children from prison, or greater insight into his domestic violence problem. Because the trial court could reasonably have reached either conclusion, our deferential standard of review is dispositive. It was not clearly erroneous for the trial court to conclude that after three and a half years, Father’s efforts simply came too late, and that E.M. and El.M. needed permanency even more than they needed a final effort at family preservation.
Conclusion
We recognize the great value of encouraging noncustodial fathers to be involved in their children’s lives. Similarly, we acknowledge the efforts Father made toward that goal after his release from prison, in sharp contrast to his earlier hostility toward services. Yet despite his efforts, there were strong indications that he still had not come to terms with the domestic violence that triggered DCS’s involvement. The children’s best interests—especially their need for permanency after years in “temporary” placement—are paramount. After hearing the extensive testimony and reviewing voluminous exhibits, the trial court was within its discretion to find the children’s needs to be weightier than Father’s belated efforts. Because we may not reweigh that evidence, we affirm the trial court.
Dickson, C.J., and David and Massa, JJ., concur.
Rucker, J., dissents with separate opinion.
Rucker, J., dissenting.
In a carefully worded and well reasoned memorandum decision the Court of Appeals concluded there was insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s judgment terminating Father’s parental rights. In re E.M., No. 45A03-1208-JT-370 (Ind. Ct. App. May 8, 2013). It therefore reversed the judgment of the trial court. I agree with the Court of Appeals and thus respectfully dissent from the majority’s contrary view.
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