Rush, J.
Child in need of services (CHINS) cases aim to help families in crisis—to protect children, not punish parents. Our focus, then, is on the best interests of the child and whether the child needs help that the parent will not be willing or able to provide—not whether the parent is somehow “guilty” or “deserves” a CHINS adjudication. But that help comes not by invitation, but compulsion—imposing the court’s “coercive intervention” into family life. And a CHINS adjudication may have long-lasting collateral consequences for the family. The intrusion of a CHINS judgment, then, must be reserved for families who cannot meet those needs without coercion—not those who merely have difficulty doing so.
Here, the evidence reflects that Mother had difficulty meeting the demands of a situation that would test the mettle of any parent—but not that she would be unable to correct her one lingering issue without the “coercive intervention of the court.” DCS’s desire to help this struggling family was understandable, but the facts simply do not justify subjecting this family to State compulsion. We therefore reverse the trial court.
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Rather, Mother’s most significant failure—to complete the home-care simulation—appears as much a product of DCS’s intervention as it is a sign of her need for that intervention. Mother’s initial plan had been for Grandmother to serve as the secondary caregiver, and it was only because of DCS’s disapproval that Mother had to go “back to the drawing board” to recruit someone else to fill that role. She did not do so until a few days before the fact-finding hearing, but did so nevertheless. In sum, she was still one step away from S.D. returning home—but only one step, and one in which the delay was at least partly a matter of DCS’s own doing.
That evidence, even viewed most favorably to the judgment, cannot reasonably support an inference that Mother was likely to need the court’s coercive intervention to finish the home-care simulation. A CHINS finding should consider the family’s condition not just when the case was filed, but also when it is heard. In re C.S., 863 N.E.2d 413, 418 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied, abrogated on other grounds by In re N.E., 919 N.E.2d 102, 105–06 (Ind. 2010). And here, Mother had resolved the issues involving S.D.’s siblings by the time of the hearing and completed all but the final step necessary for S.D.’s return home. Her approach to solving those problems was at times fitful or idiosyncratic—but it worked, as demonstrated by the siblings’ return home weeks before the fact-finding hearing, and the court’s eventual rejection of the CHINS allegations as to them. And though the State’s intervention enabled some of her progress, such as the ability to renovate the house while the children were out of her care, none of the State’s actions compelled her accomplishments. Though the evidence shows she had difficulty completing the last step of medical training, we cannot say she was unwilling or unable to do so without the court’s compulsion, see Charlton, 631 N.E.2d at 528—and so the State’s coercive intervention into the family cannot stand.
II. Is This Appeal Moot?
After we granted transfer in this case, DCS moved to dismiss this appeal, alleging it is moot because S.D. has been returned to Mother’s care, the CHINS case has been closed, and no effective relief can be granted. Mother disagrees, emphasizing that a CHINS finding can have harmful collateral consequences for the parent, and that reversal would grant Mother real relief from those consequences. We agree with Mother.
Foremost, a CHINS finding can relax the State’s burden for terminating parental rights. Under Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B)(iii) (Supp. 2013), the State may terminate parental rights if a child has been adjudicated CHINS on two prior occasions, without proving either that the conditions resulting in a child’s removal will not be remedied or that continuing the parent-child relationship threatens the child’s well-being. And a prior CHINS finding may have adverse job consequences as well, such as precluding Mother from employment with any DCS contractor. See generally Ind. Dept. of Child Servs., Ind. Child Welfare Policy Manual § 13.4 (2013), available at http://www.in.gov/dcs/files/13.4_Evaluation_of_Background_Checks_for_DCS_Contractors.pdf. Similarly, a CHINS finding may preclude her from become a licensed foster parent. Id. at § 13.10, available at http://www.in.gov/dcs/files/13_10_Evaluating_Background_Checks_for_Foster_Family_Licensing.pdf. Reversal cannot change the efforts Mother expended in complying with the CHINS case, but it still affords her meaningful relief by lifting those collateral burdens. We therefore decline to find the case moot.
Conclusion
S.D. and her siblings were legitimately in need of services when DCS filed its petitions. But by the fact-finding hearing, Mother had voluntarily addressed all but one of those concerns to the trial court’s satisfaction. In view of that judgment, the remaining evidence fails to show that Mother was likely to need the court’s coercive intervention to complete that final item—and when that coercion is not necessary, the State may not intrude into a family’s life. We therefore reverse the trial court’s judgment that S.D. was a child in need of services.
Dickson, C.J., Rucker, David, and Massa, J.J., concur.