Dickson, C.J.
In this action for damages, the plaintiffs (parents J.D. and M.D., individually and on be-half of their children, F.D., G.D., and T.D.) allege mishandling of child abuse reports by the Indiana Department of Child Services (DCS), the Evansville Police Department (EPD), and the Vanderburgh County Prosecutor’s Office (VCPO). The trial court granted summary judgment to all defendants on grounds of immunity, and the plaintiffs have appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of DCS and EPD, but not as to VCPO. As explained below, we affirm summary judgment in favor of EPD, but we reverse the summary judgment entered in favor of DCS.
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The plaintiffs claim that DCS was negligent in failing to fulfill its statutory duty, pursuant to Indiana Code Section 31-33-18-4, to notify the plaintiffs of Nephew’s alleged molestation of their daughter, F.D. [Footnote omitted.] In seeking summary judgment, DCS contends that it is immune under Indiana Code Section 34-13-3-3(6), “A governmental entity or an employee acting within the scope of the employee’s employment is not liable if a loss results from the following: . . . . (6) The initiation of a judicial or an administrative proceeding.” Ind. Code § 34-13-3-3(6). [Footnote omitted.] The provision of the ITCA upon which DCS relies is most commonly associated with suits for malicious prosecution or abuse of process. See, e.g., Waldrip v. Waldrip, 976 N.E.2d 102, 115–16 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (malicious prosecution and abuse of process), trans. not sought; Butt v. McEvoy, 669 N.E.2d 1015, 1017–18 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (malicious prosecution), trans. not sought. But see Ind. Dep’t of Fin. Insts. v. Worthington Bancshares, Inc., 728 N.E.2d 899, 902–03 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (applying the provision in favor of a state entity that acted to place a bank into receiver-ship), trans. denied. In such cases, Indiana Code Section 34-13-3-3(6) protects state officials and employees from suits brought by those who were the subject of or experienced a loss from a civil or criminal adjudication. The clearest example is a suit by a former criminal defendant against a prosecutor. See, e.g., Livingston v. Consol. City of Indianapolis, 398 N.E.2d 1302, 1306 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979) (“We hold, therefore, that in accordance with the plain wording of [Indiana Code Section 34-13-3-3(6)], immunity is granted to the State and municipal subdivisions and police officers in actions for malicious prosecution.”), trans. not sought.
In the present case, DCS “investigated the initial reports of abuse and referred [the] findings to the EPD,” whose investigation was “the catalyst for the judicial proceeding against” Nephew. Appellee DCS’s Br. at 5–6. That investigation and referral, DCS contends, should bring it under the protection of the ITCA’s provision for the “initiation of a judicial or administrative proceeding.” Ind. Code § 34-13-3-3(6). Even if we accepted DCS’s contention that there is a sufficient nexus between its investigation and referral to EPD and the initiation of the delinquency proceeding by the Vanderburgh County Prosecutor, a question which we do not decide today, DCS would not be immune under subsection (6). This is so for two reasons. First, plain-tiffs’ claims against DCS do not relate to the allegation that resulted in Nephew’s delinquency adjudication—the molestation of Son. Rather, plaintiffs contend that DCS failed to notify parents of the information it received regarding the molestation of their daughter, F.D., information which was not used in the delinquency proceeding against Nephew. Second, Indiana Code Section 34-13-3-3(6) provides immunity where “a loss results from” “[t]he initiation of a judicial or an administrative proceeding.” Ind. Code § 34-13-3-3(6) (emphasis added). Plaintiffs do not assert that any harm to them resulted from the initiation of the proceeding against Nephew. Rather, plaintiffs’ claims against DCS regarding notification of the molestation of F.D. could be the same had, at the conclusion of EPD’s investigation, the prosecutor not initiated a proceeding against Nephew. Finding the statute unambiguous, and thus reading the words of Indiana Code Section 34-13-3-3(6) in their plain, ordinary, and usual sense, we find that it does not provide DCS with immunity in this case.
With respect to EPD, the plaintiffs claim that EPD was negligent in failing to notify the plaintiffs of Nephew’s admission to the molestation of F.D. We first note, separate from the question of immunity, that at the time of these events, EPD had no duty to disclose to plaintiffs the information regarding the molestation of F.D. [Footnote omitted.] EPD’s duty under the child abuse and neglect statutes was to report the alleged abuse to DCS. See Ind. Code § 31-33-5-1 (“In addition to any other duty to report arising under this article, an individual who has reason to believe that a child is a victim of child abuse or neglect shall make a report as required by this article.”). The plain-tiffs do not dispute that EPD disclosed the information regarding the molestation of F.D. to DCS. Any further duty imposed on EPD would relate to its capacity as a law enforcement agency, discussed below.
Plaintiffs further claim that EPD was negligent in not pursuing separate charges against Nephew for the molestation of F.D. EPD asserts immunity under subsection (8) of the ITCA which grants immunity where the loss results from “[t]he adoption and enforcement of or failure to adopt or enforce a law (including rules and regulations), unless the act of enforcement constitutes false arrest or false imprisonment.” Id. § 34-13-3-3(8). [Footnote omitted.] Commonly referred to as “law enforcement immunity,” we have said that what is “required to establish immunity [is] that the activity be one in which government either compels obedience to laws, rules, or regulations or sanctions or attempts to sanction violations thereof.” Davis v. Animal Control—City of Evansville, 948 N.E.2d 1161, 1164 (Ind. 2011). It is undisputed that EPD was investigating an alleged offense—the molestation of Son by Nephew. In fact, the allegations in plaintiffs’ complaint pertain to deficiencies in EPD’s investigation and pursuit of delinquency charges with respect to Nephew. We cannot see how plaintiffs’ claim can be classified as anything other than an assertion that EPD was deficient in its “attempt[] to sanction [a] violation” of the law. Id. Subsection (8) plainly grants immunity from suit where the loss results from “failure to . . . enforce a law,” Ind. Code § 34-13-3-3(8), and accordingly, EPD is immune under the ITCA.
In summary, we conclude that EPD’s method of investigation is immune from liability under Indiana Code Section 34-13-3-3(8). Accordingly, summary judgment in favor of EPD is proper. However, because plaintiffs’ claims against DCS do not result from the “initiation of a judicial or an administrative proceeding,” DCS is not immune under Indiana Code Section 34-13-3-3(6) and summary judgment in favor of DCS is therefore improper as to this issue.
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…Here, however, DCS seeks to extend that immunity to its inaction on a separate report of abuse “because it learned of the information that it allegedly failed to reveal to [the plaintiffs] through its participation in the investigation” of the original child abuse report. Appellee DCS’s Br. at 12. Again, assuming without deciding that DCS did “participate” in the delinquency proceeding, its contention fails as a matter of law. Indiana Code Section 31-33-6-1 provides immunity from liability “that might otherwise be imposed because of” participation in a judicial proceeding resulting from or relating to a report of child abuse (emphasis added). However, the plaintiffs do not allege that DCS’s actions in the juvenile proceedings against Nephew caused them harm. Rather, plaintiffs’ suit is founded upon DCS’s statutorily delineated duty to “initiate an immediate and appropriately thorough child protection investigation of every report,” Ind. Code § 31-33-8-1(a) (2007 Supp.), and to “give verbal and written notice to each parent, guardian, or custodian of the child that: (1) the reports and information . . . relating to the child abuse or neglect investigation . . . are available upon the request of the parent . . . .” Id. § 31-33-18-4(a). Thus, plaintiffs contend that DCS’s inaction with respect to the separate report of abuse to Daughter hindered their ability to obtain proper treatment. The facts, which we must construe in favor of the plaintiffs as the non-moving party on summary judgment, do not fall within the circumstances granting immunity under the plain words of the statute—a statute which is in derogation of the common law and must be narrowly construed against immunity. Accordingly, summary judgment is not proper as to this issue.
Conclusion
We affirm the grant of summary judgment in favor of the Evansville Police Department, finding that it is immune from the plaintiffs’ claims under the Indiana Tort Claims Act. However, we reverse summary judgment with respect to the Department of Child Services, concluding that it is not immune under either the Indiana Tort Claims Act or the child abuse reporting statute. This case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.
Rucker and David, JJ., concur. Rush, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with separate opinion in which Massa, J., concurs.
Rush, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I respectfully dissent from the issue the majority decides—whether DCS is immune—as well as one that it doesn’t—whether plaintiffs may hold DCS civilly liable. First, I disagree about the threshold immunity issue. I would conclude DCS is immune because plaintiffs’ claim arises from DCS’s participation in the initiation of a judicial proceeding. Second, the majority, without providing any guidance, leaves it to the trial court to determine whether plaintiffs have a valid claim—an issue that divided the Court of Appeals panel. In the absence of immunity, Indiana law requires us to analyze whether the Legislature intended the violation of the Notice Statute to give rise to a negligence action. Applying that analysis, I can find no such legislative intent here. I do not condone DCS’s egregious conduct of allegedly not notifying parents of their child’s abuse, but not every breach of a statutory duty provides plaintiffs with a negligence action.
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I respectfully dissent from my colleagues because I conclude DCS is immune from liability, and even if it weren’t, the Notice Statute would not provide plaintiffs with a private right of action. While I do not condone DCS’s conduct, I would affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment for all defendants.
Massa, J., concurs.