Mathias, J.
Harry Tillman (“Husband”), by guardian Deborah Wagner (“Wagner”), appeals the Warrick Superior Court’s dismissal of his petition for dissolution of marriage from his wife, Virginia Tillman (“Wife”). Through his guardian Wagner, Husband argues that both the trial court’s ruling and the currently controlling law in Indiana are inconsistent with Indiana’s no-fault approach to dissolution of marriage.
We affirm.
….
Pursuant to Indiana Code section 29-3-8-4, the guardian of an incapacitated person has the power take action and make decisions for the benefit of the incapacitated person. For example, the guardian may “invest and reinvest the property of the protected person,” may exercise control over the incapacitated person’s business or income, and, if reasonable, may “delegate to the protected person certain responsibilities for decisions affecting the protected person’s business affairs and well-being.”
Neither the current Indiana statutes governing dissolution of marriage nor governing the guardianship of incapacitated persons provide a means for the guardian of an incapacitated person to file a petition for dissolution of marriage on behalf of the incapacitated person. The facts of the present case are parallel to the facts of Quear in this regard. In this case, both Husband and Wife are incapacitated and neither are competent to consent to the filing of a dissolution petition. Since Indiana statute does not provide guardians of incapacitated persons the authority to petition for dissolution of marriage on the incapacitated person’s behalf, the trial court’s dismissal of the motion Wagner filed on Husband’s behalf was proper.
Husband argues that the Quear decision is “no longer consistent” with Indiana’s no fault divorce policy. He further asserts that certain provisions of the guardianship statute can be read to allow a guardian to file for dissolution of marriage on behalf of his ward. [Footnote omitted.] While Husband would have us read these statutes broadly, we decline the invitation to contravene our supreme court’s holding in Quear.
We acknowledge that Quear was decided more than sixty years ago, in 1951. Some might argue that the intervening decades of higher and higher divorce rates and the creation of federal and state programs to assist the elderly have radically changed civil society’s notions concerning what the vows of “for better and for worse” mean. Therefore, for some, this might seem an appropriate time to revisit Quear. But Quear relied on the public policy pronouncements of the General Assembly within Indiana’s divorce and guardianship statutes, and those statutes have not changed appreciably regarding the issue before us since Quear. For example, the General Assembly has yet to provide to a guardian the statutory authority to file for dissolution of marriage on behalf of the incapacitated person. And Quear has not been modified, let alone overruled, by any subsequent supreme court decision. Therefore, Quear remains controlling law in Indiana and controls the result in this case.
Conclusion
For these reasons, we conclude that the trial court acted within its discretion when it granted Wife’s motion to dismiss.
Affirmed.
BAKER, J., and MAY, J., concur.