Mathias, J.
In domestic dispute situations, responses to police officers’ initial inquiries may often be, but are not always, non-testimonial, because the officers may need to investigate and identify the people involved in order to assess the situation, the threat to their safety, and the potential danger to the victim. Davis, 547 U.S. at 832 (2006) (citing Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Nevada, Humboldt County, 542 U.S. 177, 186 (2004)). A victim’s medical state can provide “context for first responders to judge the existence and magnitude of a continuing threat to the victim, themselves, and the public.” Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1159. We also consider not only whether the threat “to the first victim has been neutralized” but also whether the emergency “threatens the police and public[.]” Id. at 1158. The Supreme Court in Bryant noted that “[d]omestic violence cases like Davis and Hammon often have a narrower zone of potential victims than cases involving threats to public safety.” Id. However, even in domestic violence cases, the zone can extend beyond the victim. See Martin, 885 N.E.2d at 21 (holding that even though the declarant was not in danger, “she was experiencing an ongoing emergency because she did not know where her children were and she feared for their safety”).
Here, Medrano arrived at the fire station crying, scared, bruised, with an abrasion on her hand, and holding an infant child. The reasons for Medrano’s physical and emotional state were unknown. Medrano’s responses to the firefighters’ initial questions showed that Young’s whereabouts were not then known, and that he had taken the couple’s older child with him. Although Sanders testified that he did not recall Medrano being upset about Young taking their child, Medrano told firefighters that Young had beaten her and taken their child, which could reasonably concern the firefighters as to whether the older child was in danger. Thus, as to the issue of whether there was an ongoing emergency, we conclude that the firefighters’ initial inquiries into the situation were proper to assess the situation, to determine the extent of harm Medrano had suffered, and to determine whether the child with Young was at risk. Such inquiries are permissible under Crawford, and we hold that the inquiries at issue were permissible here.
Young next argues that the firefighters’ questioning of Medrano was improper because it was formal in its nature: two firefighters asking Medrano questions at a fire station for forty-five minutes. To determine the level of formality, we look at how the questions were asked, and we look at where and when the “encounter occur[ed]—e.g., at or near the scene of the crime versus at a police station, during an ongoing emergency or afterwards.” Bryant, 131 S.Ct. at 1156; Martin, 885 N.E.2d at 21 (concluding that there was little formality to the situation because the declarant was questioned while she was hysterical and sitting by the side of the road with “blood all over her face”); cf. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 66 (holding that when the victim calmly responded to questions at the police station with officers often asking leading questions, the statements were testimonial).
Here, the firefighters first encountered Medrano on a bench outside the fire station only fifteen minutes after the incident occurred, and the firefighters were largely focused on treating Medrano’s injuries. Importantly, Medrano had come to the fire station of her own volition. Furthermore, when the firefighters started to ask her questions, Medrano was crying and had bruises on her face and neck. Under these facts and circumstances, we hold that to the extent that the questioning at issue was formal, i.e., on a bench outside a fire station, it was a level of formality commensurate with the nature of Medrano’s visit, a visit she herself chose to make. We therefore hold that any formality in the firefighters’ questioning of Medrano was of an extremely low level and was invited and created by Medrano herself.
For all of these reasons, we hold that the primary purpose of the firefighters’ questioning of Medrano was to enable public, government assistance to Medrano in an ongoing emergency rather than to prove past events potentially relevant to future criminal prosecution. Therefore, the admission of Medrano’s statements to the firefighters did not violate Young’s confrontation rights under the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. See Bryant, 131 S.Ct. at 1155-57; Davis, 547 U.S. at 828-30; Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59.
VAIDIK, J., and BARNES, J., concur.