Mathias, J.
….
Here, the 911 recording involves multiple hearsay because Bishop relayed statements made by Saylor. Therefore, under Rule 805, Saylor’s statements to Bishop and Bishop’s statements to the 911 operator must both fall within a hearsay exception to be admissible. See Palacios, 926 N.E.2d at 1030.
Teague concedes that Saylor’s statements to Bishop were an excited utterance. Appellant’s Br. at 9. However, Teague argues that Bishop’s statements to the 911 operator were not an excited utterance and hence were inadmissible hearsay. . . . .
. . . .
Here, a bloodied Saylor came to Bishop’s house in the middle of the night distraught and screaming that her mother had been beaten up. Bishop could also hear Behnen screaming from her own porch next door. Bishop immediately called 911 and answered the operator’s questions. An excited utterance can be made in response to a question so long as the statement is unrehearsed and is made under the stress of excitement from the event. Yamobi v. State, 672 N.E.2d 1344, 1346 (Ind. 1996) (“A declaration does not lack spontaneity simply because it was an answer to a question.”).
During the 911 call, Saylor could be heard crying in the background, and Bishop told the operator that she was going to remain at her own house, because she was not certain whether the perpetrators were still in Behnen’s house. Throughout the conversation, Bishop had no time to reflect before making her statements. For all of these reasons, we conclude that Saylor’s arrival at her home was a startling event and that Bishop made her statements regarding the incident to the 911 operator while she was under the stress of this event.
In Noojin v. State, our supreme court held that “it is assumed, although not specifically stated in the rule, that an excited utterance must be based on the declarant’s personal knowledge[.]” 730 N.E.2d 672, 677 (Ind. 2000). However, Noojin involved a situation where no one had personal knowledge of the underlying incident, rather the declarant’s statements regarding the incident were based on “conjecture[.]” Id. Thus, it is a matter of first impression for our court whether a 911 recording that involves statements by a caller that were relayed from a victim are admissible where the victim had personal knowledge of the underlying incident but the caller did not. This issue has been addressed in other jurisdictions. See e.g., Williamson v. State, 707 A.2d 350, 353 (Del. 1998) (holding that the 911 call was admissible as an excited utterance where the 911 caller was relaying the victim’s statements to the 911 operator); cf. Bemis v.Edwards, 45 F.3d 1369, 1373 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that statements made during a 911 call were inadmissible where the 911 caller did not witness the events he described but rather relayed the observations of other people because the caller did not have personal knowledge of the underlying incident).
Here, Bishop did not have personal knowledge of the underlying incident Saylor described, but she did have personal knowledge of, and was responding to, the startling event or condition that came to her home in the middle of the night in the person of a bloodied Saylor screaming for help. She heard Behnen moaning in pain from her injuries on her front porch next door. The 911 call confirms that Bishop was assiduous in relaying the operator’s questions to Saylor and Saylor’s answers in return. For all of these reasons, we conclude that the facts and circumstances before us bear sufficient indicia of reliability, the hallmark of all hearsay exceptions. We further conclude that these facts and circumstances are sufficient to meet all of the requirements of an excited utterance. Thus, we hold that Bishop’s statements relaying Saylor’s answers to the 911 operator are admissible as excited utterances.
VAIDIK, J., concurs
BARNES, J., concurs in result.