MATHIAS, J.
Gaby argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it permitted the State to refresh M.C.’s recollection using the transcript of a previous interview. . . . .
Indiana Evidence Rule 612(a) provides, “[i]f, while testifying, a witness uses a writing or object to refresh the witness’s memory, an adverse party is entitled to have the writing or object produced at the trial, hearing, or deposition in which the witness is testifying.” Our supreme court has explained that “[a]lthough Evidence Rule 612(a) clearly envisions the use of writings to refresh a witness’s memory, it ‘does not address the method by which the witness’s memory may be refreshed.’” Thompson v. State, 728 N.E.2d 155, 160 (Ind. 2000) (quoting 13 Robert Lowell Miller, Jr., Indiana Practice § 612.101, at 225 (2d ed. 1995)). The court in Thompson “agree[d] with Judge Miller that a ‘simple colloquy’ is all that is required under Rule 612.” Id.
The witness must first state that he does not recall the information sought by the questioner. The witness should be directed to examine the writing, and be asked whether that examination has refreshed his memory. If the witness answers negatively, the examiner must find another route to extracting the testimony or cease the line of questioning.
Id. (quoting Miller, § 612.101, at 226) (emphasis added).
At Gaby’s trial, the following colloquy occurred between the prosecutor and M.C.:
Q. What happened when you went over to [Gaby]? You’re just now wearing a shirt, no pants, no underwear?
A. He made me sit down and he put a blanket and fingered me.
Q. Say again?
A. He fingered me.
Q. What do you mean by he fingered you?
A. He put his fingers inside of my vagina.
. . . .
Q. Okay. Did he say anything to you when he put his fingers in your vagina?
A. No.
Q. Okay, was he making any sounds or noises or anything while he was doing this?
A. No.
Q. Okay, did he say anything afterwards?
A. He just told me to get dressed.
Q. Okay. Did he ever explain to you or — what he was doing or why he was doing this?
A. No.
Q. Okay. Did you [sic] touch you anywhere else besides your vagina?
A. No.
Q. Okay. Ever touch your bottom, your chest, anything like that?
A. No.
Q. Okay. Did you ever see his genitals, his private parts?
A. No.
Q. Okay. Did he ever have you touch his private parts?
A. No.
Q. Okay. So this one time that you can remember you can remember him touching your vagina with his fingers inside?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. Let me jump ahead for a second. Do you remember when — this time last year, April of ’09 when you finally told what he had done many, many years ago and you were interviewed at a special house called Hartford House, do you remember that?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. And do you remember seeing a copy of your statement, of your interview?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. Did I in fact give you a copy?
A. Yes, ma’am.
Q. If I showed you a copy of that do you think that would refresh your memory as to some of these questions I just asked?
A. Yes.
Tr. pp. 43-46 (emphases added).
At this point, Gaby’s counsel objected, arguing that M.C. had not shown a lack of recollection and that refreshing her recollection was therefore inappropriate. The trial court overruled this objection. [Footnote omitted.] After M.C. had reviewed her previous statement, the State then continued to question her as follows:
Q. Okay. Did reading through your transcript of your interview today refresh your memory or help you remember what you had told the interviewer last year?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. Did he ever say anything when he was doing that to you with his hands?
* * *
A. He like — he said like — asked if it felt good and stuff. No.
Q. Okay. Did he touch you anywhere else at that time?
A. (indiscernible)
Q. Okay, remember what you read in your interview?
A. Yeah, like he — like he touched my chest
* * *
A. But like it was just like a touch.
Q. Okay. And do you remember him ever having you touch his private
parts?
A. No.
Q. Okay. Either outside his clothes or under his clothes either one?
A. No.
Q. Okay. I’ll have you read your page twelve again and see if you understand my question. Okay. Was [Gaby] making any — saying anything to you other than does it feel good or you like it, which was it? I’m sorry.
A. Heavy breathing also.
Q. Okay. What do you mean by that?
A. Like breathing really heavy.
Q. Okay, breathing that was not normal?
A. [affirmative response].
Q. Okay. And did he ever expose himself to you I think was one of the questions?
A. No.
Q. Okay, but did he ever have you touch himself?
A. Yes.
Q. What part of his body did he have you touch?
A. His penis.
Q. Okay. At that age did you know what that was?
A. No.
Tr. pp. 49-50.
We agree with Gaby that the transcript clearly shows that M.C. did not testify as to any lack of recollection regarding the events before the prosecutor showed her the transcript of her previous statement. M.C. simply gave answers the prosecutor neither expected nor desired. The prosecutor attempted to rectify this by having M.C. read the transcript of her previous statement, after which M.C. still struggled to give the prosecutor the desired answers.
We therefore conclude that there was no foundation for refreshing M.C.’s recollection because she did not state that she was unable to recall the information sought by the questioner. . . . We agree
with the following statement of the Missouri Court of Appeals in State v. McKinney, 763
S.W.2d 702, 708 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989):
[W]here a witness has testified positively and readily so as to indicate that his memory is not obscured, one may not be permitted, in the guise and on the pretext of refreshing the witness’ recollection, to make use of a favorable memorandum with an actual view to contradicting the witness or inducing him to change his testimony.
Id. (citations and internal quotations omitted). This is precisely what the prosecutor did in the present case.
The State argues that the prosecutor’s behavior was justified as impeachment, noting that, pursuant to Evidence Rule 607, a party may impeach its own witness. This argument rings hollow. The State had no motive to attack the credibility of M.C., who was the State’s main witness. To the contrary, the State’s entire case depended upon the credibility of M.C.’s testimony regarding an event that happened approximately twelve years ago when M.C. was approximately three years old. [Footnote omitted.] It is clear that the prosecutor did not wish to impeach M.C.; she asked M.C. if reading the transcript of her previous statement would “refresh her memory,” and asked again after she had read the transcript if doing so had “refresh[ed] her memory.” Tr. pp. 46, 49. The State also referred to some of the “refreshed” recollections in its closing argument as substantive evidence, not for impeachment purposes. Specifically, the State referred to Gaby’s “heavy breathing,” a detail that M.C. described only after she had read the transcript of her earlier statement. Tr. pp. 192-93. Evidence admitted only for impeachment may not be used as substantive evidence. See Humphrey v. State, 680 N.E.2d 836, 840 (Ind. 1997).
Under these facts and circumstances we are compelled to conclude that the trial court abused its discretion when it permitted the State to allow M.C. to read the transcript of her previous statement when M.C. had not testified that she could not recall the information sought by the prosecutor. See McKinney, 763 S.W.2d at 708 (concluding that trial court erred in permitting witness to use police report to “refresh” his recollection even though witness had testified “clearly and unhesitatingly” to events at issue). [Footnote omitted.]
KIRSCH, J., and VAIDIK, J., concur.