MATHIAS, J.
Nine days after the murder, on September 3, 2008, Fort Wayne Police Officer Raquel Foster (“Officer Foster”) was in her patrol car when she observed a vehicle make a turn without using a turn signal. Officer Foster initiated a traffic stop of the car and, although the windows of the car were darkly tinted, recognized the driver as Parish because the driver’s side window was down. Officer Foster immediately called for backup because Fort Wayne police officers were on “high alert” that Parish was armed. Parish was also a suspect in several shootings, including the murder of Woods. And approximately two weeks prior to the stop, an officer in the “gang unit” of the police department had warned other officers that Parish had threatened to kill the next police officer he encountered and claimed that his cocaine or methamphetamine use would numb him to any pain if he got into a shootout with the police.
Before any backup arrived, Officer Foster quickly approached the car and told Parish to step out of the vehicle. Parish did not immediately comply, but asked Officer Parish why she did not want to see his driver’s license, vehicle registration, or proof of insurance. Officer Foster told Parish that she knew who he was and repeated her instructions to step out of the car. This time, Parish slowly took off his seat belt and got out of his car. Officer Foster took Parish to the back of his car and began a pat-down search. Before Officer Foster could finish the pat-down search, Officer Drummer arrived on the scene, handcuffed Parish, and started another pat-down search.
While Parish was handcuffed and being patted down by Officer Drummer, Officer Foster began a protective search of Parish’s car. At the suppression hearing, Officer Foster explained that she was specifically looking for a handgun because of the reports that Parish was armed. Officer Foster looked under the seats, between the seat and the console, and behind the seats, or as she explained at the suppression hearing, “wherever I could reach.” . . . .
When Officer Foster attempted to open the glove box, it was locked. She therefore “immediately” pulled the key from the ignition and unlocked the glove box “without even thinking.” . . . Inside, she found a Smith and Wesson revolver, a small scale, and a plastic baggie with a leafy green substance that Officer Foster identified as marijuana. Officer Foster explained her reasons for the search of the glove box by stating that, because she had pulled Parish over for a traffic stop, “I was just, within his reach, anything, because if I put him back into that car, anything that was within his reach.” . . . .
. . . Despite the fact that she had just found Parish in possession of handgun and marijuana, Officer Foster simply issued a citation to Parish for failure to use a turn signal, put him back into his car, and let him go.
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On appeal, Parish claims that Officer Foster improperly searched his locked glove box. Specifically, Parish claims that Officer Foster had no reasonable fear for officer safety that would justify a protective search of the passenger compartment of the car. Parish acknowledges that an officer with a reasonable suspicion that a motorist is dangerous and may be able to gain immediate control of weapons may conduct a protective search of the passenger compartment of the vehicle without a warrant. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049-50 (1983). . . . But such protective searches must be confined to “those areas in which a weapon may be placed or hidden.” Long, 463 U.S. at 1049. And “’[t]he purpose of a limited search for weapons after an investigative stop is not to discover evidence of a crime, but to allow the officer to pursue his investigation without fear for his safety or the safety of others.’” Jackson v. State, 785 N.E.2d 615, 620 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (quoting State v. Joe, 693 N.E.2d 573, 575 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998)).
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Under these facts and circumstances, a reasonably prudent person in Officer Foster’s position would be warranted in the belief that her safety was in danger. Officer Foster was therefore justified in searching the passenger compartment of Parish’s car, limited to those areas in which a weapon might be placed or hidden. . . . .
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We think it goes without saying that a glove box is a place where a weapon could easily be placed or hidden. But here Officer Foster searched inside a locked glove box. We must therefore determine whether the locked glove box is part of the passenger compartment that can be searched as part of a protective search. In other words, does the fact that the glove box was locked mean that Parish could not gain immediate control of any weapon hidden therein? Although there appears to be no Indiana case directly on point, [footnote omitted] the federal courts of appeal, including the Seventh Circuit, have held that a locked glove box may be searched during a protective search of an automobile.
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These cases make a valid point: even if removed from the car during a traffic stop, the occupants of the car are typically allowed to return to the car after any citation is issued, and once back inside the car, the occupants have easy access to even a locked glove box.4 [4 This is unlike a search incident to arrest where a driver is arrested and secured. See Arizona v. Gant, 129 S.Ct. 1710, 1719 (2009) (holding that search of defendant’s car incident to arrest was impermissible under the Fourth Amendment where defendant had been handcuffed and secured prior to search and was therefore “not within reaching distance of his car at the time of the search.”). Indeed, here Officer Foster explained that she searched the glove box to ensure that there were no weapons within Parish’s reach if he returned to his car. . . . And she further stated that she was able to unlock the glove box in only a few seconds. . . . Following the federal cases cited above, we conclude that, under the Fourth Amendment, the warrantless search of Parish’s locked glove box was permissible as part of a protective search of places in the passenger compartment of the vehicle where a weapon could be placed or hidden. [Footnote omitted.]
BRADFORD, J., concurs.
RILEY, J., dissents with separate opinion:
[I]n its recent decision of Arizona v. Gant,— U.S. —, 129 S.Ct. 1710, 1723-24, 173 L.Ed.2d 485 (2009), the United States Supreme Court significantly limited the ability of law enforcement to search a vehicle and brought the nature of a vehicle search back to its original limited rationale:
Police may search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant’s arrest only if the arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest. When these justifications are absent, a search of an arrestee’s vehicle will be unreasonable unless police obtain a warrant or show that another exception to the warrant requirement applies.
In Gant, Gant and his two passengers had been removed from his car, handcuffed, and placed in separate police cars. Id. The Supreme Court held that concern for officer safety could not justify searching Gant’s car because no suspect could have accessed any weapon that might be in his car. Id.
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While we are dealing here with a traffic stop, rather than an arrest, the fact remains that Parish, like Gant, was removed from his car and handcuffed. Accordingly, because Parish no longer posed a threat, the officers cannot justify a search of his car based on a concern for officer safety. The justification of the search diminishes even more in light of the fact that the officers released Parish after the search. A more prudent course of action for the officers would have been to take Parish into custody as a “suspect in several shootings” and then request a search warrant for his car. . . . .
As such, pursuant to the directives in Gant, I would grant Parish’s motion to suppress the evidence of the illegal search and remand for a new trial.