RILEY, J.
Here, we agree with the State that the 911 caller who spotted the blue Volkswagen should be considered an identified informant or concerned citizen, as opposed to an anonymous tip, and, thus, the tip was a circumstance which bore in favor of reasonable suspicion. However, we conclude that the police failed to ‘couple’ the concerned citizen’s tip with corroborative investigation. See id. at 353 (“tip from an identified informant or concerned citizen coupled with some corroborative police investigation is sufficient to create reasonable suspicion for an investigative stop”) (emphasis added). In Kellems, our supreme court twice noted that the police officer confirmed that the license plate of the vehicle driven by Kellems matched the number given by the concerned citizen tipster. Id. at 353 and 357. Here, however, the sole witness called by the State testified that he did not know whether another blue car, or another Volkswagen was parked in the gas station parking lot at the time Renzulli’s vehicle was stopped. It may be possible that another officer checked to be sure that Renzulli’s vehicle was the only vehicle at the gas station that matched the description given by the 911 caller, but the State did not introduce that evidence at the suppression hearing. As we have stated above, the State bears the burden of proving that an exception to the warrant requirement is present. Coleman, 847 N.E.2d at 262. In light of the lack of any evidence that the police officers corroborated that Renzulli’s car was the vehicle which the 911 caller referred to, we cannot conclude that the trial court’s grant of the motion to suppress was contrary to law.
MATHIAS, J., concurs in result with separate opinion:
I respectfully concur in result. I do so believing that the State’s procedural decisions at the trial court level have forfeited its appeal.
. . . .
As noted above, the governing statute provides that the State may appeal “[f]rom an order granting a motion to correct errors.” I.C. § 35-38-4-2(3) (emphasis added). Here, however, the trial court denied the State’s motion, and there is simply no statutory authority for the State to appeal from an order denying the State’s own motion to correct error.
. . . .
. . . I would hold that although the State had the right to appeal from the trial court’s order granting Renzulli’s motion to suppress, the State’s right to appeal was forfeited when it failed to file its notice of appeal within thirty days after that order. The State simply had no authority to appeal from its interim, denied motion to reconsider, a motion that was by operation of law a motion to correct errors.
BRADFORD, J., dissents with separate opinion:
Here, I believe that the record establishes that the officers had reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop of Renzulli’s vehicle. The record establishes that a concerned citizen alerted officers to erratic driving by an individual driving a blue Volkswagen. This concerned citizen provided law enforcement officials with his identity and his phone number. He described the erratic driving as being “all over the road” and running over a curb. . . . The concerned citizen notified law enforcement officials of both his location and the location of the blue Volkswagen. In light of these facts coupled with the rational inferences that officers could draw from these facts, I believe that the police officers had reasonable suspicion to believe that the driver of the blue Volkswagen, who was later determined to be Renzulli, was operating a vehicle while intoxicated in violation of Indiana law. I would therefore reverse the trial court’s order granting Renzulli’s motion to suppress.