MATHIAS, J.
A.M.B. (“Mother”) appeals the involuntary termination of her parental rights to her three children, A.B., J.B., and M.M. Mother raises several allegations of error, including an assertion that she was denied due process of law when she was not permitted to testify during the termination hearing. Although Mother was twenty minutes late to the termination hearing, which itself commenced more than an hour behind schedule, we believe that under the unique facts and circumstances before us, she should have been afforded the opportunity to testify. In light of the constitutional dimensions of the right to parent one’s child, we reverse and remand for at least the opportunity for Mother to be heard.
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Mother initially failed to appear for the termination hearing on July 7, 2009. Although originally set to begin at 8:30 a.m., the termination hearing did not actually get underway until 9:44 a.m. At the commencement of the hearing, the juvenile court was informed that Mother was not present, that she had failed to show for her attorney-client meeting the previous week, and that she had never contacted her attorney. An oral motion to continue the evidentiary hearing was then made.
The juvenile court denied the motion to continue. Mother’s attorney, Joann Price, thereafter asked for leave to withdraw her appearance as counsel for Mother, stating she had never spoken with or met Mother. The juvenile court granted attorney Price’s motion for leave to withdraw, informed Price she was “free to go,” and proceeded with the evidentiary hearing. Tr. p. 23.
The State called King as its first and only witness. At the conclusion of King’s testimony, counsel stated, “That’s all I have.” Id. at 39. The juvenile court then asked King a few additional questions before dismissing the witness.
Immediately after dismissing King from the witness stand, the bailiff informed the juvenile court judge that Mother had arrived at the courthouse. The time noted for the record was 10:05 a.m. The judge commented that Mother “could see [Price]” but further stated, “I’m going to go forward[.] We’re almost done here.” Id. at 41. Mother was never permitted to enter the courtroom.
After asking the remaining attorneys if there was “anything else,” to which the attorneys answered in the negative, the juvenile court granted LCDCS’s petition to involuntarily terminate Mother’s parental rights to A.B., J.B., and M.M., and the hearing was adjourned. . . . .
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These are very hard and unusual facts, and our opinion should not be broadly extended to other cases and circumstances. This court does not condone Mother’s failure to appear for the termination hearing in a timely manner. As a panel, we are acutely aware of the fact that Mother’s tardy appearance was undoubtedly inconvenient and frustrating for all of the other parties involved, especially after her general lack of concern and cooperation with authorities regarding her children. Nevertheless, the slight delay, the small, additional cost and even any incremental emotional strain upon the children that may have resulted from permitting Mother to participate in the remainder of the evidentiary hearing are far outweighed by the fairness that Mother’s participation would have ensured. After balancing Mother’s substantial interest with that of the State, and in light of the heightened risk of error created by the challenged procedure, we conclude that the juvenile court violated Mother’s constitutional right to due process of law when it prohibited Mother from participating in the termination hearing.
BARNES, J., and BROWN, J., concur.