DARDEN, J.
The trial court held a probation revocation hearing on December 4, 2008, during which the trial court and Davis’ counsel engaged in the following colloquy:
[Court]: All right, we’ll show the defendant appears on a violation of probation. And allegations are that he’s got—I don’t know what he’s got.
[Counsel]: I’ll make it short for you Judge. We’ll admit the new arrest under [Cause No. 545]. Admit that he was arrested only. The agreement is twelve years DOC contingent also upon the fact that if he beats that Court Five case, we would be allowed to come back to have the twelve years revisited.
[Court]: Yes?
[Counsel]: That is the agreement. The agreement is revisited not automatically changed.
. . . .
[Court]: All right, we’ll show twelve years. Probation revoked. Twelve years . . . . The Court will maintain jurisdiction depending on the outcome of the other case.
[Footnote omitted.] Thus, the trial court revoked Davis’ probation and imposed a sentence of twelve years. With the exception of a brief discussion regarding credit time, the above exchange constituted the entire hearing.
. . . .
. . . Although the State alleged several probation violations, the trial court apparently was unaware as to the specific allegations, and Davis’ counsel “[a]dmit[ted] that he was arrested only.” (Tr. 4). Davis’ counsel did not admit that there was probable cause for the charge against Davis; furthermore, the State provided no evidence that Davis had committed a criminal offense. As there was only an admission to an arrest without a probable cause finding and neither party entered the probable cause affidavit into evidence, we find that the probation revocation hearing denied Davis minimum due process. Furthermore, we cannot say that the issuance of a probable cause affidavit in the underlying case satisfied the probable cause requirements.. . . .
The State, however, argues that Davis was not entitled to due process rights as he admitted to violating his probation. We acknowledge that an admission of a probation violation by a probationer’s attorney is binding upon the probationer. . . . Where, however, the admission itself is insufficient to support a probation revocation, we cannot agree it renders the procedural due process safeguards and evidentiary hearing unnecessary. . . . Given that Davis’ probation revocation hearing did not comport with due process, and therefore, insufficient evidence was presented to support the revocation, we reverse the revocation of Davis’ probation.
ROBB, J., concurs.
MATHIAS, J., dissents with separate opinion:
As the majority correctly notes, when a probationer admits to a violation, the procedural due process safeguards are unnecessary. . . . Here, Davis did not simply admit that he had been arrested; it is apparent from the references to “the agreement” between Davis and the State that he also agreed that his probation would be revoked, while reserving the right to “revisit” the issue if he was acquitted on the other pending charges.
. . . .
Under these facts and circumstances, I would hold that Davis was not denied due process and affirm the trial court’s decision to revoke his probation.