MATTHIAS, J.
Farmer first claims that the trial court erred by referring to two of the State’s witnesses as “experts” in the presence of the jury. Specifically, with regard to witness Scott Owens, the State asked initial questions regarding Owens’s qualifications, then said to the trial court, “Your Honor, I have tendered this witness as an expert in the area of trace evidence analysis.” Tr. p. 681. The trial court asked Farmer’s counsel for a response, to which he stated:
Your Honor, I don’t believe that it is appropriate to tender a witness . . . as an expert. I think it is more appropriate to elicit opinion testimony and whether the foundation has met relative to that opinion elicited, is the basis for the objection. So, I don’t think courts recognize witnesses as experts until opinions are elicited.
. . . After a response by the State, the trial court ultimately concluded, “This witness would be found to be of such a nature that he would render an opinion which if that makes him an expert in this area, then he would be an expert in this area.” . . . Similarly, when the State tendered Shawn Tucker as an “expert,” the trial court stated, “I’ll determine he is an expert at this point.” . . . .
In support of his argument, Farmer cites Campbell v. Shelton, 727 N.E.2d 495 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), trans. denied. In that case, the plaintiff stated to the trial court, “Your Honor, I offer Dr. Robert Sexton as an expert in the field of neurosurgery that he is licensed in and practices in.” . . . After a bench conference, the trial court stated, “We’ll recognize Dr. Sexton as an expert in his field.” . . . On appeal, the court explained that only the jury is permitted to determine the weight to be given a witness’s testimony and that it is improper for a trial court to endorse a witness. [Footnote omitted.] . . .Thus, neither counsel nor the trial court should refer to witnesses as “experts” in the presence of the jury. . . . The Campbell court concluded that reversal was not warranted, however, because the jury in that case would not have understood the trial court’s remarks to have been an endorsement. . . . The court specifically noted that the trial court had referred to other witnesses as “experts,” including some of Campbell’s witnesses, and Campbell’s own attorney had referred to his own witnesses, and the witness at issue on appeal, as “expert” witnesses. “Viewed in this context,” the court concluded, “we believe Campbell overstates the effect upon the jurors of the trial court comments in question.” . . . .
In the present case, we first note that Farmer’s response to the State’s tender of Owens as an expert was not based on the same grounds he now argues on appeal. Although Farmer argued that it was not “appropriate to tender a witness . . . as an expert,” he later explained, “I don’t think courts recognize witnesses as experts until opinions are elicited.” . . .Thus, Farmer did not necessarily take issue with the trial court recognizing Owens as an expert, but complained only about when such recognition took place. Farmer’s response to the State’s tender of Tucker as an expert was, “Same response as previous tender.” . . . Further, there is no indication that Farmer “t[ook] any other curative measure.” See Campbell, 727 N.E.2d at 498. We therefore conclude, as did the court in Campbell, that Farmer has failed to preserve this issue for purposes of appeal. . . . .
Waiver notwithstanding, Farmer would still not prevail. Farmer does not claim that Owens and Tucker were not experts; he claims only that the trial court should not have referred to them as such in front of the jury. However, the trial court instructed the jury regarding expert witnesses as follows:
You should judge the testimony of the expert witness in the same manner as you judge the testimony of any other witness. In deciding its weight, you may also take into consideration the expert’s skill, experience, knowledge, veracity, familiarity with the facts of this case, and the general rules for deciding the credibility of witnesses.
. . . The jury was further instructed that they were “the exclusive judges of the evidence, which may be either witness testimony or exhibits.” . . .Thus, after the jury heard the judge referred to the witnesses as experts, they were instructed that they were the exclusive judges of all witness testimony, including experts. Although the trial court should not have referred to the witnesses as experts in the presence of the jury, under these facts and circumstances, we cannot conclude that the trial court’s statements constitute reversible error.
RILEY, J., concurs.
KIRSCH, concurs in result.