Montejo v. Arizona, No. 07-1529, __ U.S. __ (May 26, 2009)

SCALIA, J.
We consider in this case the scope and continued viability of the rule announced by this Court in Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 106 S. Ct. 1404, 89 L. Ed. 2d 631 (1986), forbidding police to initiate interrogation of a criminal defendant once he has requested counsel at an arraignment or similar proceeding.
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Montejo waived his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966),  and was interrogated at the sheriff’s office by police detectives through the late afternoon and evening of September 6 and the early morning of September 7. During the interrogation, Montejo repeatedly changed his account of the crime, at first claiming that he had only driven Moore to the victim’s home, and ultimately admitting that he had shot and killed Ferrari in the course of a botched burglary. These police interrogations were videotaped.
On September 10, Montejo was brought before a judge for what is known in Louisiana as a “72-hour hearing” — a preliminary hearing required under state law.  [Footnote omitted.]  Although the proceedings were not transcribed, the minute record indicates what transpired: “The defendant being charged with First Degree Murder, Court ordered N[o] Bond set in this matter. Further, Court ordered the Office of Indigent Defender be appointed to represent the defendant.”  . . . .
Later that same day, two police detectives visited Montejo back at the prison and requested that he accompany them on an excursion to locate the murder weapon (which Montejo had earlier indicated he had thrown into a lake). After some back-and-forth, the substance of which remains in dispute, Montejo was again read his Miranda rights and agreed to go along; during the excursion, he wrote an inculpatory letter of apology to the victim’s widow. Only upon their return did Montejo finally meet his court-appointed attorney, who was quite upset that the detectives had interrogated his client in his absence.
At trial, the letter of apology was admitted over defense objection. The jury convicted Montejo of first-degree murder, and he was sentenced to death.
The Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence. 06-1807 (1/16/08), 974 So. 2d 1238 (2008). As relevant here, the court rejected Montejo’s argument that under the rule of Jackson, supra, the letter should have been suppressed. 974 So. 2d, at 1261. Jackson held that “if police initiate interrogation after a defendant’s assertion, at an arraignment or similar proceeding, of his right to counsel, any waiver of the defendant’s right to counsel for that police-initiated interrogation is invalid.” 475 U.S., at 636, 106 S. Ct. 1404, 89 L. Ed. 2d 631.
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It is worth emphasizing first what is not in dispute or at stake here. Under our precedents, once the adversary judicial process has been initiated, the Sixth Amendment  guarantees a defendant the right to have counsel present at all “critical” stages of the criminal proceedings. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227-228, 87 S. Ct. 1926, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1149 (1967); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 57, 53 S. Ct. 55, 77 L. Ed. 158 (1932). Interrogation by the State is such a stage. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 204-205, 84 S. Ct. 1199, 12 L. Ed. 2d 246 (1964); see also United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 274, 100 S. Ct. 2183, 65 L. Ed. 2d 115 (1980).
Our precedents also place beyond doubt that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel may be waived by a defendant, so long as relinquishment of the right is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 292, n. 4, 108 S. Ct. 2389, 101 L. Ed. 2d 261 (1988); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 404, 97 S. Ct. 1232, 51 L. Ed. 2d 424 (1977); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S. Ct. 1019, 82 L. Ed. 1461 (1938). The defendant may waive the right whether or not he is already represented by counsel; the decision to waive need not itself be counseled. Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 352-353, 110 S. Ct. 1176, 108 L. Ed. 2d 293 (1990). And when a defendant is read his Miranda rights (which include the right to have counsel present during interrogation) and agrees to waive those rights, that typically does the trick, even though the Miranda rights purportedly have their source in the Fifth Amendment:
“As a general matter . . . an accused who is admonished with the warnings prescribed by this Court in Miranda . . . has been sufficiently apprised of the nature of his Sixth Amendment rights, and of the consequences of abandoning those rights, so that his waiver on this basis will be considered a knowing and intelligent one.” Patterson, supra, at 296, 108 S. Ct. 2389, 101 L. Ed. 2d 261.
The only question raised by this case, and the only one addressed by the Jackson rule, is whether courts must presume that such a waiver is invalid under certain circumstances. 475 U.S., at 630, 633, 106 S. Ct. 1135, 89 L. Ed. 2d 410. We created such a presumption in Jackson by analogy to a similar prophylactic rule established to protect the Fifth Amendment based Miranda right to have counsel present at any custodial interrogation. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S. Ct. 1880, 68 L. Ed. 2d 378 (1981), decided that once “an accused has invoked his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation . . . [he] is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available,” unless he initiates the contact. Id., at 484-485, 101 S. Ct. 1880, 68 L. Ed. 2d 378.
The Edwards rule is “designed to prevent police from badgering a defendant into waiving his previously asserted Miranda rights,” Harvey, supra, at 350, 110 S. Ct. 1176, 108 L. Ed. 2d 293. It does this by presuming his postassertion statements to be involuntary, “even where the suspect executes a waiver and his statements would be considered voluntary under traditional standards.” McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 177, 111 S. Ct. 2204, 115 L. Ed. 2d 158 (1991). This prophylactic rule thus “protect[s] a suspect’s voluntary choice not to speak outside his lawyer’s presence.” Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162, 175, 121 S. Ct. 1335, 149 L. Ed. 2d 321 (2001) (KENNEDY, J., concurring).
Jackson represented a “wholesale importation of the Edwards rule into the Sixth Amendment.” Cobb, supra, at 175, 121 S. Ct. 1335, 149 L. Ed. 2d 321. The Jackson Court decided that a request for counsel at an arraignment should be treated as an invocation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel “at every critical stage of the prosecution,” 475 U.S., at 633, 106 S. Ct. 1135, 89 L. Ed. 2d 410, despite doubt that defendants “actually inten[d] their request for counsel to encompass representation during any further questioning,” id., at 632-633, 106 S. Ct. 1135, 89 L. Ed. 2d 410, because doubts must be “resolved in favor of protecting the constitutional claim,” id., at 633, 106 S. Ct. 1135, 89 L. Ed. 2d 410. Citing Edwards, the Court held that any subsequent waiver would thus be “insufficient to justify police-initiated interrogation.” 475 U.S., at 635, 106 S. Ct. 1135, 89 L. Ed. 2d 410. In other words, we presume such waivers involuntary “based on the supposition that suspects who assert their right to counsel are unlikely to waive that right voluntarily” in subsequent interactions with police. Harvey, supra, at 350, 110 S. Ct. 1176, 108 L. Ed. 2d 293.
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What does the Jackson rule actually achieve by way of preventing unconstitutional conduct? Recall that the purpose of the rule is to preclude the State from badgering defendants into waiving their previously asserted rights. See Harvey, supra, at 350, 110 S. Ct. 1176, 108 L. Ed. 2d 293; see also McNeil, 501 U.S., at 177, 111 S. Ct. 2204, 115 L. Ed. 2d 158. The effect of this badgering might be to coerce a waiver, which would render the subsequent interrogation a violation of the Sixth Amendment. See Massiah, supra, at 204, 84 S. Ct. 1199, 12 L. Ed. 2d 246. Even though involuntary waivers are invalid even apart from Jackson, see Patterson, 487 U.S., at 292, n. 4, 108 S. Ct. 2389, 101 L. Ed. 2d 261, mistakes are of course possible when courts conduct case-by-case voluntariness review. A bright-line rule like that adopted in Jackson ensures that no fruits of interrogations made possible by badgering-induced involuntary waivers are ever erroneously admitted at trial.
But without Jackson, how many would be? The answer is few if any. The principal reason is that the Court has already taken substantial other, overlapping measures toward the same end. Under Miranda‘s prophylactic protection of the right against compelled self-incrimination, any suspect subject to custodial interrogation has the right to have a lawyer present if he so requests, and to be advised of that right. 384 U.S., at 474, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694.  Under Edwards‘ prophylactic protection of the Miranda right, once such a defendant “has invoked his right to have counsel present,” interrogation must stop. 451 U.S., at 484, 101 S. Ct. 1880, 68 L. Ed. 2d 378. And under Minnick‘s prophylactic protection of the Edwards right, no subsequent interrogation may take place until counsel is present, “whether or not the accused has consulted with his attorney.” 498 U.S., at 153, 111 S. Ct. 486, 112 L. Ed. 2d 489.
These three layers of prophylaxis are sufficient. Under the Miranda–Edwards–Minnick line of cases (which is not in doubt), a defendant who does not want to speak to the police without counsel present need only say as much when he is first approached and given the Miranda warnings. At that point, not only must the immediate contact end, but “badgering” by later requests is prohibited. If that regime suffices to protect the integrity of “a suspect’s voluntary choice not to speak outside his lawyer’s presence” before his arraignment, Cobb, 532 U.S., at 175, 121 S. Ct. 1335, 149 L. Ed. 2d 321 (KENNEDY, J., concurring), it is hard to see why it would not also suffice to protect that same choice after arraignment, when Sixth Amendment rights have attached. And if so, then Jackson is simply superfluous.
It is true, as Montejo points out in his supplemental brief, that the doctrine established by Miranda and Edwards is designed to protect Fifth Amendment, not Sixth Amendment, rights. But that is irrelevant. What matters is that these cases, like Jackson, protect the right to have counsel during custodial interrogation — which right happens to be guaranteed (once the adversary judicial process has begun) by two sources of law. Since the right under both sources is waived using the same procedure, Patterson, supra, at 296, 108 S. Ct. 2389, 101 L. Ed. 2d 261, doctrines ensuring voluntariness of the Fifth Amendment waiver simultaneously ensure the voluntariness of the Sixth Amendment waiver.
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In sum, when the marginal benefits of the Jackson rule are weighed against its substantial costs to the truth-seeking process and the criminal justice system, we readily conclude that the rule does not “pay its way,”  United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907-908, n. 6, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 82 L. Ed. 2d 677 (1984). Michigan v. Jackson should be and now is overruled.
ROBERTS, C.J., and KENNEDY, THOMAS, and ALITO, JJ., joined.
ALITO, J., filed a concurring opinion in which KENNEDY, J., joined.
STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion in which SOUTER and GINSBURG, J.J., joined and in which BREYER, J., joined except for note 5:
Today the Court properly concludes that the Louisiana Supreme Court’s parsimonious reading of our decision in Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 106 S. Ct. 1404, 89 L. Ed. 2d 631 (1986), is indefensible. Yet the Court does not reverse. Rather, on its own initiative and without any evidence that the longstanding Sixth Amendment protections established in Jackson have caused any harm to the workings of the criminal justice system, the Court rejects Jackson outright on the ground that it is “untenable as a theoretical and doctrinal matter.” Ante, at 6. That conclusion rests on a misinterpretation of Jackson‘s rationale and a gross undervaluation of the rule of stare decisis. The police interrogation in this case clearly violated petitioner’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
BREYER, J., filed a dissenting opinion.