To impose the IC 35-48-4-15(a) mandatory license suspension for using a vehicle in the commission of a drug offense, the “State must demonstrate that a defendant made more than an incidental use of a motor vehicle in committing his offense”; evidence defendant “possessed a jar of marijuana by keeping the jar on the floorboard in front of him while he sat in the passenger seat” supported suspension; it was “not a situation in which a defendant merely happened to possess a small bag of marijuana in his pocket without making any direct use of the vehicle to do so.”
Supreme
Person v. Shipley, No. 20S03-1110-CT-609, ___ N.E.2d ___ (Ind., Jan. 31, 2012).
Trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting expert testimony offered by a personal injury defendant in a rear-end collision case.
Bennett v. Richmond, No. 20S03-1105-CV-293, ___ N.E.2d ___ (Ind., Jan. 31, 2012).
Trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting expert testimony offered by a personal injury defendant in a rear-end collision case.
Hill v. State, No. 45S03-1105-PC-283, __ N.E.2d __ (Ind., Jan. 24, 2012).
Standard for assessing effective performance of Post-Conviction Rule 2 counsel is the Baum “due-course-of-law” standard, not the two-prong Sixth Amendment Strickland standard.
Ind. Dept. of Ins. v. Everhart, No. 84S01-1105-CV-28, ___ N.E.2d ___ (Ind., Jan. 20, 2012).
The Indiana Patient’s Compensation Fund was not entitled to a reduction in the award of damages to account for the chance that the plaintiff would have died even in the absence of the physician’s negligence, because of how the trial court’s particular findings of fact interact with the rules for calculating a set-off.