Evidence of defendant’s possession of tools useful for theft but not used to break and enter, of the retail nature of the business premises broken into, and of the fact that the defendant had a residence he could use for shelter sufficed to prove his intent to commit theft in the premises he broke and entered.
P. Riley
State v. Owens, No. 49A02-1210-CR-817, __ N.E.2d __ (Ind. Ct. App., Aug. 15, 2013).
When the police had illegally detained the suspect and discovery of the cocaine on his person became inevitable due to the illegal stop, suppression of the cocaine was required even though its actual discovery occurred when the suspect fled and was reapprehended.
Redington v. State, No. 53A01-1210-CR-461, __ N.E.2d __ (Ind. Ct. App., Aug. 6, 2013).
Rejects challenges based on the Indiana Constitution to the statutory procedure for retaining firearms of a “dangerous” person and concludes that evidence supported the trial court’s finding the respondent was “dangerous” so that his fifty-one firearms should be retained by the police.
Coats v. State, No. 49A02-1206-CR-526, __ N.E.2d __ (Ind. Ct. App., Feb. 7, 2013).
The better practice is to follow the statutory commitment procedures concerning competence to stand trial, but here the trial court did not err in not using those procedures where the defendant’s dementia left no hope that competency could be restored.
In re Resnover, No. 49A02-1205-MI-364, ___ N.E.2d ___ (Ind. Ct. App., Dec. 5, 2012).
In an action for a name change, “a petitioner must submit with the petition for a name change the documents requested in I.C. § 34-28-2-2.5—including a driver’s license number or identification card number—if applicable…. [A]lthough we have decided that the language of subsection 2.5 does not carry a mandate, but rather a directory intent, the trial court is still obliged to discern the absence of a fraudulent purpose prior to granting a petitioner’s name change.”