In a probation revocation, the trial court must apply the preponderance standard in determining whether a new offense was committed; points out that a line of Court of Appeals decisions saying probable cause is the standard failed to note the 1983 statutory change requiring preponderance.
N. Vaidik
Clark v. State, No. 48A04-1104-CR-249, __ N.E.2d __ (Ind. Ct. App., Dec. 5, 2011).
When probation is transferred to another county, the forty-five day filing deadline for a revocation in I.C. 35-38-2-3(a)(2)(B) begins when the receiving court with supervisory authority has notice of the violation, and not when the sentencing court first learns of the violation.
Jones v. State, No. 34A05-1101-CR-66, __ N.E.2d __ (Ind. Ct. App., Dec. 5, 2011).
Police substantially complied with statute on destruction of hazardous chemicals so that photographs and other evidence of the chemicals was properly admitted at trial.
Davis v. Shelter Ins. Companies, No. 02A05-1105-CT-256, ___ N.E.2d ___ (Ind. Ct. App., Nov. 21, 2011).
Adopts the following test to determine the availability of equitable estoppel as an affirmative defense against statute of limitations in insurance actions: “The first part of the test, drawing on the national case law, is to determine whether the insurer has engaged in any of the following: (1) a promise to settle; (2) discouraging the claimant from filing suit; (3) discouraging the claimant from obtaining counsel; or (4) otherwise egregious conduct. If one of those behaviors is present, then the court will engage in the second part of the test by looking at the totality of the circumstances surrounding the insurer’s actions. Equitable estoppel will be available to the claimant when the circumstances surrounding the insurer’s conduct have induced the claimant to delay timely action…and the claimant’s reliance on the insurer’s statements or actions was reasonable…” (Internal citations omitted.)
Gearlds v. State, No. 90A02-1105-CR-433, __ N.E.2d __ (Ind. Ct. App., Oct. 24, 2011).
Error in statute defining A misdemeanor driving while suspended with a prior within ten years does not prevent its enforcement.