Statute requiring “a person who is required to register as a sex or violent offender in any jurisdiction” to likewise register in Indiana did not violate Indiana ex post facto clause as applied to Texas offender who moved to Indiana after 2006 enactment of that statute. Texas law already required offender to register; maintaining that status in Indiana was not punitive under the intent-effects test.
M. Massa
State v. Zerbe, No. 49S05-1509-MI-529, ___ N.E.3d ___ (Ind., Feb. 25, 2016).
Michigan sex offender was not distinguishable from offender in Tyson v. State, even though Michigan enacted its registration requirement two years after defendant’s offense. Relevant question was not whether Michigan registration requirement was ex post facto law, but only that the requirement existed at the time offender moved to Indiana.
Bonnell v. Cotner, No. 66503-1509-PL-530, __ N.E.3d __ (Ind., Feb. 16, 2016).
Sale of the strip of land by tax deed extinguished any and all interest the party previously possessed by adverse possession.
Shane Keller v. State, No. 88S04-1506-CR-354, ___ N.E.3d ___, (Ind. Jan. 25, 2016).
Jury instruction defining “dwelling” element of B-felony burglary was misleading and invaded the province of the jury. Burglary convictions therefore had to be reduced to Class C felonies.
Beasley v. State, No. 49S02-1601-CR-20, ___ N.E.3d ___ (Ind. Jan. 14, 2016).
Trial court acted within its discretion under Evid. R. 804(b)(3) to admit murder victim’s hearsay statement that he shot at defendant the night before as a “statement against interest”; statement was unambiguous and had a great “tendency … to expose the declarant to civil or criminal liability,” even though declarant believed he had acted in self-defense.