Father’s intentional criminal actions of killing his daughter and himself trigger the intervening, superseding cause doctrine, and broke the causal chain between the defendant’s alleged negligence and the daughter’s death; none of the actions or inaction of any of the defendants could be considered a proximate cause of the daughter’s death as a matter of law.
J. Baker
Gilbert v. State, No. 49A04-1102-CR-77, __ N.E.2d __ (Ind. Ct. App., Sept. 26, 2011).
Undercover officer’s statement that he wanted sex from prostitution suspect were not hearsay and accordingly were not subject to Confrontation Clause protection, and defendant in any event had opportunity to confront second officer when he testified as to the first’s statement.
Fratter v. Rice, No. 53A04-1101-CT-1, ___ N.E.2d ___ (Ind. Ct. App., Sept. 19, 2011).
The court properly gave the Indiana Model Civil Jury Instruction for responsible cause because it “closely tracks our Supreme Court’s definition of proximate cause” and although it does not contain the word “omission,” the term “conduct” includes both acts and omissions.
Villagrana v. State, No. 08A05-1101-CR-21, __ N.E.2d __ (Ind. Ct. App., Aug. 24, 2011).
“Indiana does not criminally penalize those who negligently neglect a dependent.”
Kornelik v. Mittal Steel USA, Inc., et al., No. 45A03-1011-CT-58, ___ N.E.2d ___ (Ind. Ct. App., Aug. 10, 2011).
An injured employee who settles with a third party for substantially less than the damages value of his claim without the consent of his employer or his worker’s compensation carrier can subsequently reduce his lien arising under the Indiana Worker’s Compensation Act by attorney fees and pro rata costs pursuant to Indiana Code section 22-3-2-13; however, the injured employee cannot reduce the lien in the same proportion that his full recovery was reduced pursuant to Ind. Code 34-51-2-19.