Even though the window tint of defendant’s vehicle was not quite dark enough to establish a Window Tint Statute violation, the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle for a Window Tint violation when he could not “clearly recognize or identify the occupant inside” “coupled with the fact that the actual tint closely border[ed] the statutory limit.”
B. Dickson
Wright v. Miller, No. 54S01-1207-CT-430, __ N.E.2d __ (Ind., June 21, 2013).
Trial court erred in excluding plaintiffs’ expert witness when the circumstances of the case warranted “some lesser, preliminary, or more pointed sanction fashioned to address counsel’s unsatisfactory conduct in this case without depriving the plaintiffs of their ability to present the merits of their case at trial.”
Hartman v. State, No. 68S01-1305-CR-395, __ N.E.2d __ (Ind., May 31, 2013).
Incriminating statements made to detectives during an early morning interrogation in the county jail were inadmissible because the defendant had invoked his right to counsel at an interrogation two days before.
Meredith v. Pence, No. 49S00-1203-PL-172,___ N.E.2d ___ (Ind., March 26, 2013).
“[T]he Indiana school voucher program, the Choice Scholarship Program, is within the legislature’s power under Article 8, Section 1, and that the enacted program does not violate either Section 4 or Section 6 of Article 1 of the Indiana Constitution.
Heaton v. State, No. 48S02-1206-CR-350, __ N.E.2d __ (Ind., Mar. 5, 2013).
A probation revocation court must apply the preponderance standard, not probable cause, in determining whether the state has proved the defendant committed a new offense.