Trial court should have dismissed, rather than denied, defendant’s habeas petition that was in substance an unauthorized successive PCR.
Appeals
Roar v. State, No. 49A02-1506-CR-506 , ___ N.E.3d ___ (Ind. Ct. App., April 21, 2016).
Conditional threat to victim (that “if I came back on the property[] he’d kill me”) supported conviction for intimidation (disagreeing with C.L. v. State, 2 N.E.3d 798, 801 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. not sought and Causey v. State, 45 N.E.2d 1239 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. not sought).
Meunier-Short v. State, No. 32A01-1507-CR-96, ___ N.E.3d ___ (Ind. Ct. App., April 14, 2016).
Trial court was not required to conduct indigency hearing before assessing fines, costs, and fees as condition of probation, but it must do so at some point before completion of probation or before revoking probation for failure to pay.
Trial court lacked authority to impose substance-abuse or drug-countermeasures fees.
Trial court abused its discretion in ordering defendant to return to school and maintain “C” average while being employed full-time; statute permits either maintaining full-time employment or “faithfully pursu[ing]” a course of study to equip him for employment.
Ogburn v. State, No. 8A01-1509-CR-1546, ___ N.E.3d ___ (Ind. Ct. App., April 18, 2016).
Smell of burnt marijuana, observed during exigent-circumstance entry into apartment, did not provide probable cause for search warrant when officer did not explain why he concluded smell was not from neighboring apartment; and seizure of key fob for vehicle where large bundles of marijuana were found exceeded scope of warrant’s authorization for “indicia of occupancy, residency or ownership.” State failed to prove K-9 sniff of vehicle would have been conducted independent of the tainted evidence. Because bundles of marijuana were poisoned fruit and should have been suppressed, conviction was reversed.
Daugherty v. State, No. 89A01-1510-PC-1532, ___ N.E.3d ___ (Ind., Apr. 5, 2016).
Consecutive sentences for two counts of SVF in possession of a firearm did not constitute a double enhancement,; but they exceeded the statutory cap for a “single episode of criminal conduct.”