Defendant’s argument that live testimony on sexually violent predator status was required by the SVP statute was waived by defendant’s failure at sentencing to object to its absence.
Brogan v. State, No. 57A04-0910-CR-592, __ N.E.2d __ (Ind. Ct. App., May 6, 2010)
When sentence for sex offense was completely served, and original sentencing order did not require sex offender registration, and offender was imprisoned in another county for an unrelated offense when he filed his “motion” under sex offense cause number to be relieved of statute-imposed registration duty on ex post facto grounds, the sex offense court was not the appropriate forum for the registration challenge.
In re the Paternity of N.L.P., No. 45S03-0904-JV-133, ___ N.E.2d ___ (Ind., Apr. 30, 2010)
Where the parties in a domestic relations dispute sign a written agreement retaining the services of a guardian ad litem, the trial court is bound to enforce the terms of the agreement when awarding fees and expenses incurred by the GAL, unless the terms are contrary to public policy.
Cutter v. Classic Fire & Marine Ins. Co., No. 49A05-0906-CV-315, ___ N.E.2d ___ (Ind. Ct. App., May 5, 2010)
Cutter v. Classic Fire & Marine Ins. Co. (Ind. Ct. App., Crone, J.) – (1) Because employees’ claim against employer was completely distinct from employer’s claim against his insurance company, a distribution from the insurance company’s liquidation estate to the employer’s assignee did not implicate the prohibition against double recovery; (2) because a suit for the dissolution of an insurance company has been regarded as an equitable action, the suit was not triable to a jury.
Chapo v. Jefferson County Plan Com'n, No. 39A01-0908-CV-408, ___ N.E.2d ___ (Ind. Ct. App., May 5, 2010)
(1) Trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendants’ motion for “travel, postage, and copying” costs under Trial Rule 41(E) (failure to prosecute); (2) because defendants were forced to defend against a frivolous and groundless claim, however, trial court did abuse its discretion in denying defendants’ motion for attorney’s fees pursuant to Ind. Code § 34-52-1-1(b).