“[I]n addition to instructing the jury (correctly) on the elements of attempted murder under a theory of direct liability, the trial court gave an accomplice liability instruction that . . . failed to set forth that an accomplice must have the specific intent to kill when he or she knowingly or intentionally aids, induces, or causes another to attempt to commit murder”; the error was fundamental due both to the general verdict form which did not indicate whether the conviction was based on the direct attempt theory or the accomplice theory and to the State’s repeated erroneous assertions that specific intent to kill was not required for accomplice liability.
Young v. Hood’s Gardens, Inc., No. No. 29S02-1405-PL-314, __ N.E.3d __ (Ind., Jan. 22, 2015).
“[T]he “value” attributable to the performance of work that triggers secondary liability under Indiana Code section 22-3-2-14(b) [Worker’s Compensation Act] includes both direct monetary payment as well as any ancillary consideration received for the work.”
J.P. v. Mid American Sound, No. 49A04-1405-CT-207, __ N.E.3d __ (Ind. Ct. App., Jan. 14, 2015).
The Indiana Tort Claims Act aggregate liability cap, as applied to the defendant, is constitutional.
Gertiser v. Stokes, No. 29A02-1401-DR-43, __ N.E.3d __ (Ind. Ct. App., Jan. 14, 2015).
It should have been considered a substantial and continuing change of circumstances when a woman receiving spousal maintenance now has substantial income and assets as a result of remarriage.
Jacobs v. State, No. 49S04-1403-CR-162, __ N.E.3d __ (Ind., Jan. 8, 2015).
Trial judge properly excluded specific instances of conduct offered to show witness’s untruthfulness.