(1) Because habitual-offender predicate offenses were not factually contested, trial judge who had prosecuted the predicate offenses was not required to recuse. (2) A “pattern of racketeering activity” under Indiana’s corrupt business influence statute, like similar federal RICO statute, requires proof that the predicate offenses “amount to or pose a threat of continued criminal activity.”
Brewer v. State, No. 82A05-1410-CR-458, ___ N.E.3d ___ (Ind. Ct. App., June 4, 2015).
Under Indiana’s statutory double jeopardy protections, defendant’s Kentucky convictions for receiving stolen property (a car) and fleeing/evading police (1) barred subsequent prosecution for having stolen the car in Indiana, but (2) did not bar prosecution for resisting law enforcement in Indiana for evading police in Evansville before crossing the border in Kentucky.
Stafford v. Szymanowski, No. 89S01-1502-CT-64, __N.E.3d __ (Ind., June 2, 2015).
The patient’s designated expert medical testimony created a genuine issue of material fact regarding doctor’s negligence.
Kramer v. Catholic Charities of the Diocese of Fort Wayne-South Bend, Inc., No. 71S03-1506-CT-350, __N.E.3d __ (Ind., June 3, 2015).
Because the applicable Indiana statute does not impose the requirement of a pre-placement registry check, and because the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that adoption agency had any duties in excess of its statutory obligations, summary judgment for the adoption agency was properly granted.
Jenkins v. State, No. 20A04-1410-CR-489, ___ N.E.3d ___ (Ind. Ct. App., May 26, 2015).
“Breaking” element of burglary was satisfied when defendant gained entry to an apartment by pushing aside a person standing near the entry, then immediately subduing the occupant by force.