An informant’s declaration against penal interest can furnish sufficient basis for establishing the informant’s credibility.
Smith v. Franklin Township Community School Corp., No. 20S-CT-98, __ N.E.3d __ (Ind., Aug. 25, 2020).
Trial Rule 41(F) filing was improperly used to to collaterally attack the merits of the trial court’s dismissal order.
Wadle v. State, No. 19S-CR-340, __ N.E.3d __ (Ind., Aug. 18, 2020).
In overruling Richardson, the Indiana Supreme Court set forth the following test: When multiple convictions for a single act or transaction implicate two or more statutes, a court first looks to the statutes themselves. If either statute clearly permits multiple punishment, whether expressly or by unmistakable implication, the court’s inquiry comes to an end and there is no violation of substantive double jeopardy. But if the statutory language is not clear, then a court must apply the included offense statutes to determine whether the charged offenses are the same. See I.C. § 35-31.5-2-168. If neither offense is included in the other (either inherently or as charged), there is no violation of double jeopardy. But if one offense is included in the other (either inherently or as charged), then the court must examine the facts underlying those offenses, as presented in the charging instrument and as adduced at trial. If, based on these facts, the defendant’s actions were “so compressed in terms of time, place, singleness of purpose, and continuity of action as to constitute a single transaction,” then the prosecutor may charge the offenses as alternative sanctions only. If the defendant’s actions prove otherwise, a court may convict on each charged offense.
Powell v. State, No. 19S-CR-527, __ N.E.3d __ (Ind., Aug. 18, 2020).
While Indiana’s attempted-murder statute contains no clear unit of prosecution, the multiple shots defendant fired—despite their proximity in space and time—amount to two chargeable offenses based on his dual purpose of intent to kill both victims.
Reece v. Tyson Fresh Meats, Inc., No. 20A-CT-214, __ N.E.3d __ (Ind. Ct. App., Aug. 20, 2020).
Defendant was not negligent when its grass grew so high that the grass blocked the view at the intersection because the “dangerous condition” was confined to defendant’s property.