A juvenile court does not have subject matter jurisdiction to waive an alleged delinquent offender into adult criminal court if the individual is no longer a “child.”
Criminal
State v. Stone, No. 20A-CR-421, __ N.E.3d __ (Ind. Ct. App., Aug. 31, 2020).
An informant’s declaration against penal interest can furnish sufficient basis for establishing the informant’s credibility.
Wadle v. State, No. 19S-CR-340, __ N.E.3d __ (Ind., Aug. 18, 2020).
In overruling Richardson, the Indiana Supreme Court set forth the following test: When multiple convictions for a single act or transaction implicate two or more statutes, a court first looks to the statutes themselves. If either statute clearly permits multiple punishment, whether expressly or by unmistakable implication, the court’s inquiry comes to an end and there is no violation of substantive double jeopardy. But if the statutory language is not clear, then a court must apply the included offense statutes to determine whether the charged offenses are the same. See I.C. § 35-31.5-2-168. If neither offense is included in the other (either inherently or as charged), there is no violation of double jeopardy. But if one offense is included in the other (either inherently or as charged), then the court must examine the facts underlying those offenses, as presented in the charging instrument and as adduced at trial. If, based on these facts, the defendant’s actions were “so compressed in terms of time, place, singleness of purpose, and continuity of action as to constitute a single transaction,” then the prosecutor may charge the offenses as alternative sanctions only. If the defendant’s actions prove otherwise, a court may convict on each charged offense.
King v. State, No. 20A-CR-6, __ N.E.3d __ (Ind. Ct. App., Aug. 13, 2020).
Driver’s license suspension with no controlling words such as “until” or “to” expires on 12:00 a.m. on the listed date and is no longer in effect from the beginning of that day; not 11:59 p.m.
State v. Vande Brake, No. 20S-CR-499, __ N.E.3d __ (Ind., Aug. 4, 2020).
The State has discretion to seek a firearm enhancement—which, necessarily, also means the State can withdraw or waive that enhancement.