When officer who made the investigatory stop did not testify as to her reasons for making the stop and supporting officer’s testimony amounted only to “postulation” as for reasons for the initial stop, there was no showing that there was any constitutional basis for stopping the defendant.
Criminal
Cartwright v. State, No. 82S01-1109-CR-564, __ N.E.2d __ (Ind., Feb. 22, 2012).
Affirms trial court’s rejection of Batson challenge.
Abbott v. State, No. 34S02-1202-CR-110, __N.E.2d __ (Ind., Feb. 22, 2012).
Maximum sentence was inappropriate when B felony enhancement was due to the arresting officer’s stopping the defendant’s car a few yards from a church.
Addison v. State, No. 49S05-1105-CR-267, __ N.E.2d __ (Ind., Feb. 22, 2012).
In addressing a Batson challenge by a defendant who failed to rebut the State’s purported race-neutral explanation at trial, the fundamental error standard is used on appeal to evaluate the argument the explanation was a pretext; concludes State’s explanation was a pretext when “the State failed to strike apparently similarly situated non-black venirepersons, . . . mischaracterized Turner’s voir dire testimony when offering its race-neutral reason for striking him from the panel and failed to engage Turner in any meaningful voir dire examination on the issue of his reliance on expert witness testimony.”
Hampton v. State, No. 84S04-1103-PC-161, __ N.E.2d __ (Ind., Feb. 14, 2012).
When the evidence of the actus reus of the crime is entirely circumstantial, an instruction is required that “[i]n determining whether the guilt of the accused is proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you should require that the proof be so conclusive and sure as to exclude every reasonable theory of innocence.” Pattern Instruction on the topic inappropriately has the jury rather than the judge determine whether evidence is all circumstantial, and mens rea evidence should not be subject to the special instruction. In this case, DNA evidence would appropriately have been considered as circumstantial.