(1) Because habitual-offender predicate offenses were not factually contested, trial judge who had prosecuted the predicate offenses was not required to recuse. (2) A “pattern of racketeering activity” under Indiana’s corrupt business influence statute, like similar federal RICO statute, requires proof that the predicate offenses “amount to or pose a threat of continued criminal activity.”
Criminal
Brewer v. State, No. 82A05-1410-CR-458, ___ N.E.3d ___ (Ind. Ct. App., June 4, 2015).
Under Indiana’s statutory double jeopardy protections, defendant’s Kentucky convictions for receiving stolen property (a car) and fleeing/evading police (1) barred subsequent prosecution for having stolen the car in Indiana, but (2) did not bar prosecution for resisting law enforcement in Indiana for evading police in Evansville before crossing the border in Kentucky.
Jenkins v. State, No. 20A04-1410-CR-489, ___ N.E.3d ___ (Ind. Ct. App., May 26, 2015).
“Breaking” element of burglary was satisfied when defendant gained entry to an apartment by pushing aside a person standing near the entry, then immediately subduing the occupant by force.
Dunn v. State, No. 49A02-1407-CR-470, ___ N.E.3d ___ (Ind. Ct. App., May 26, 2015).
Court abused its discretion by granting State’s motion to withdraw a plea agreement because the victim had not been notified; victim-notice error was invited by State’s sworn assertion in connection with the plea agreement that victim had been notified.
Bowman v. State, No. 21A04-1404-CR-180, ___ N.E.3d ___ (Ind. Ct. App., May 26, 2015).
Without lab test, field test, or corroborating circumstantial evidence, testimony that the product of a controlled buy “looked like” heroin was insufficient to prove dealing in a narcotic drug within 1,000 feet of a school.