It is a violation of Article 1, section 11 of the Indiana Constitution for an officer who subsequently arrives on scene to detain, and search an individual, without any additional evidence of suspicion, after that individual was released by an officer who was previously on scene.
Criminal
Kirby v. State, No. 22A-CR-2971, __ N.E.3d __ (Ind. Ct. App., Aug. 17, 2023).
While the silent witness theory’s foundation requirements are applicable when a video is admitted into evidence, the requirements also applicable when: (1) witnesses testified regarding the substance of a video; (2) the video recorded events that the witnesses themselves did not observe first-hand; and (3) the video was not offered into evidence.
Turner v. State, No. 22A-CR-2404, __ N.E.3d __ (Ind. Ct. App., Aug. 8, 2023).
An evidentiary harpoon occurs when the State deliberately places inadmissible evidence before the jury to prejudice the jurors against the defendant. Where an evidentiary harpoon has been introduced at trial, the reviewing court requires a high level of assurance that the irregularity did not affect the verdict before it will affirm the judgment. It is not enough that the verdict is supported by sufficient evidence; the reviewing court must be able to say with certainty that the improper testimony did not influence the verdict.
Tyson v. State, No. 22A-PC-143, __ N.E.3d __ (Ind. Ct. App., Aug. 11, 2023).
A request for a change of judge pursuant to Indiana Post-Conviction Rule 1(4)(b) requires the judge to examine the affidavit, treat the historical facts recited in the affidavit as true, and determine whether these facts support a rational inference of bias or prejudice. However, adverse rulings and findings by a trial judge from past proceedings with respect to a particular party are generally not sufficient reasons to believe the judge has a personal bias or prejudice.
Young v. State, No. 22A-CR-2923, __ N.E.3d __ (Ind. Ct. App., Aug. 14, 2023).
The testimony of a police officer, by itself, that he was acting as an agent of the property owner is insufficient to establish that the officer was in fact an agent of the owner. Therefore, a police officer who is neither an owner of a property nor an agent of an owner of a property cannot create a trespass violation by asking a patron to leave and then arrest the patron when they refuse to do so.