May, J.
Mahde M. Dannon pursues an interlocutory appeal of the trial court’s order denying his motion to dismiss the charges pending against him. He raises one issue, which we restate as whether the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (“IAD”) requires dismissal of the charges. We affirm.
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Dannon contends the trial court erred when it denied his motion to dismiss.
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Dannon argues the failure-to-appear bench warrant is a detainer and his January 21, 2025, motion to dismiss was a request for final disposition that triggered the IAD’s 180-day clock for the State to try him on the underlying charges. The IAD is a compact between Indiana, the federal government, and various other governmental entities designed “to ‘encourage the expeditious and orderly disposition of [outstanding] charges and determination of the proper status of any and all detainers based on untried indictments, informations or complaints.’” State v. Thompson, 687 N.E.2d 225, 227 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (quoting Carchman v. Nash, 473 U.S. 716, 720 (1985)) (brackets in Thompson).
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“A detainer is ‘a notification filed with the institution in which a prisoner is serving a sentence, advising that he is wanted to face pending criminal charges in another jurisdiction.’” Webb v. State, 437 N.E.2d 1330, 1331 (Ind. 1982) (quoting U.S. v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340, 359 (1978)); see also Fex v. Michigan, 507 U.S. 43, 44 (1993) (explaining that a “detainer” “is a request filed by a criminal justice agency with the institution in which a prisoner is incarcerated, asking that the prisoner be held for the agency, or that the agency be advised when the prisoner’s release is imminent”). “Generally, the IAD process begins when a state bringing charges against a prisoner in custody in another IAD jurisdiction files a detainer. Once a detainer is filed, the defendant may file a request for final disposition, which triggers the requirement that he be brought to trial within 180 days.” State v. Robinson, 863 N.E.2d 894, 896 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (internal citation omitted), trans. denied.
Dannon contends the failure-to-appear bench warrant is a detainer because the trial court issued the warrant “to effectuate [Dannon’s] appearance for prosecution in Indiana.” (Appellant’s Br. at 12.) Dannon asserts the bench warrant was “a public notice advising that Dannon is wanted to face pending criminal charges in Indiana,” and it “was also issued after an information was filed and the charges were untried.” (Id. at 12-13.)
The State contends the IAD does not apply because “no formal detainer has ever been lodged against” Dannon. (Appellee’s Br. at 9.) It argues the bench warrant is not a detainer based on “any untried indictment, information or complaint,” Ind. Code § 35-33-10-4, Art. (3)(a), because “[i]ts legal basis is the court’s inherent authority to enforce its own orders and manage its own docket, not a charging instrument supported by probable cause that the defendant committed a new criminal act.” (Appellee’s Br. at 12.) However, a bench warrant ceases to exist when the underlying cause is dismissed. Dearing v. State, 95 N.E.2d 832, 835 (Ind. 1951). Indiana Code section 35-33-10-1 gives the trial court authority to issue a warrant for a criminal defendant’s immediate arrest if the defendant is released on his own recognizance or on bail and fails to appear in court at a designated time after receiving notice. The failure to appear is itself an arrestable offense and gives rise to probable cause to arrest. Clark v. State, 367 N.E.2d 1117, 1118 (Ind. Ct. App. 1977).
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In Crawford v. State, our Indiana Supreme Court held that an arrest warrant related to a 1965 murder was not a detainer because it was not based upon an untried indictment, information, or complaint. 669 N.E.2d 141, 148-49 (Ind. 1996). The Court explained the warrant was not based on an untried indictment or information because, at that time, a trial for murder could only occur as a result of a grand jury indictment and no grand jury had returned an indictment for the murder. Id. at 148. The warrant was a mechanism for the defendant to be held pending the grand jury probable cause determination. Id. The Court also held the warrant was not a complaint within the meaning of the IAD because “a complaint must be more than just the affidavit upon which an arrest warrant is based.” Id. at 149. Unlike in Crawford, the bench warrant for Dannon’s arrest was issued after the State had filed a formal information charging him with Level 6 felony criminal confinement and Class A misdemeanor battery, and it was based upon a probable cause determination that Dannon had failed to appear for a scheduled pretrial conference. Consequently, we conclude the arrest warrant was sufficient to serve as a detainer for purposes of the IAD. See, e.g., Noelker, 148 N.E.3d at 351 n.4 (holding that an arrest warrant based on untried charges sufficed as a detainer for IAD purposes).
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The failure-to-appear bench warrant issued by the trial court when the trial court knew Dannon was in federal custody constituted a detainer under the IAD. However, Dannon did not follow the procedure outlined in the IAD for requesting final disposition of the charges pending against him. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s denial of Dannon’s motion to dismiss.
Affirmed.
Pyle, J., and Scheele, J., concur.