T.H. (Stepfather) filed a petition to adopt his minor stepson (Child). Child’s mother, M.H. (Mother), consented to the adoption, but Child’s biological father, C.J.W. (Father), opposed it. Ultimately, the trial court determined Father’s consent was not required, found adoption was in Child’s best interest, and granted the adoption petition. Father appeals, raising three issues which we restate as:
1) Whether Stepfather was prohibited from adopting Child because of a previous conviction for Level 5 criminal recklessness;
2) Whether the trial court clearly erred in concluding Father’s consent was not required; and
3) Whether the trial court clearly erred in concluding adoption by Stepfather was in Child’s best interest.
The first issue presents a novel question of statutory interpretation, which we answer by holding Stepfather could adopt Child because his conviction was more than five years old when the court granted the petition. On the second and third issues, we find the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the judgment, does not necessarily lead to conclusions opposite those made by the trial court. We therefore affirm the court’s decision.
…
Father first argues the trial court should have denied Stepfather’s petition because of his criminal recklessness conviction. An adoption petition cannot be granted if the petitioner has been convicted of any “nonwaivable offense . . . ,” I.C. § 31-19-11-1(c), including felony criminal recklessness, Ind. Code § 31-9- 2.1-168(11) (2026). But such a conviction is not disqualifying “if the date of the conviction did not occur within the immediately preceding five (5) year period.”7 I.C. § 31-19-11-1(c). The parties here disagree on the meaning of the phrase “immediately preceding five (5) year period.” According to Father, subsection (c) prohibited Stepfather from adopting because his conviction was less than five years old when he filed the petition. But Stepfather argues the petition was properly granted because the conviction was more than five years old “when the court act[ed] on the petition . . . .” Appellee’s Br. at 20 (emphasis added).
Because no Indiana appellate court has previously addressed what date subsection (c) sets as the anchor to calculate the five-year disqualification period, it is an issue of first impression. Statutory interpretation is a question of law reviewed de novo. R.R. v. State, 106 N.E.3d 1037, 1040 (Ind. 2018). Our goal is to carry out the legislature’s intent by giving an unambiguous statute “its clear and plain meaning.” Suggs v. State, 51 N.E.3d 1190, 1194 (Ind. 2016) (quoting State v. Evans, 810 N.E.2d 335, 337 (Ind. 2004), reh’g denied). We resort to rules of statutory construction only if a statute is ambiguous, meaning it “admits of more than one interpretation.” Id. In our review, we must “examine the statute as a whole,” reading “sections of an act together so that no part is rendered meaningless if it can be harmonized with the remainder of the statute.” Alvey v. State, 10 N.E.3d 1031, 1033 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), aff’d on reh’g by 15 N.E.3d 72.
We begin with the text and structure of section 31-19-11-1, which we find to be unambiguous. Subsection (a) outlines various elements that, if satisfied, require the court to “grant the petition for adoption and enter an adoption decree.” I.C. § 31-19-11-1(a). Subsections (b), (c), and (d) then describe circumstances under which the petition “may not” be granted, each of which negates an element of subsection (a). Subsection (b), for instance, requires denial if an affidavit has not been filed indicating whether a putative father is entitled to notice of the proceedings. This mirrors subsection (a)(4)’s requirement that such an affidavit must be filed for the petition to be granted. Under subsections (c) and (d), an adoption may not be granted if the petitioner has been convicted of certain offenses, which reflects subsection (a)(8)’s requirement that the petitioner must not be “prohibited from adopting . . . as the result of an inappropriate criminal history described in subsection (c) or (d).”
The fact that subsection (c) relates back to subsection (a)(8) gives us a clear anchor date for determining whether a conviction was “within the immediately preceding five (5) year period.” Subsection (a) provides that its elements must be satisfied “whenever the court has heard the evidence . . . .” (emphasis added). By instructing the court to rule on the merits only after it “has heard the evidence,” the statute requires that the petition be granted if the court, after the close of evidence, finds the elements of subsection (a) to be satisfied. A necessary corollary is that under subsection (c), the petition must be denied if the petitioner’s criminal history makes him ineligible to adopt when the court enters its final order, regardless of his eligibility at the time the petition was filed.
This conclusion finds further support in the plain text of subsection (c). Subsection (c) limits the trial court’s power to enter an adoption decree by providing that “the court may not grant an adoption if a petitioner for adoption has been convicted of a nonwaivable offense” unless “the date of the conviction did not occur within the immediately preceding five (5) year period.” I.C. § 31- 19-11-1(c). Because subsection (c) is concerned with the court’s power to grant an adoption petition rather than the petitioner’s eligibility to file, it’s clear the phrase “immediately preceding five (5) year period” refers to the date the court rules on the petition, not the filing date. Indeed, if the legislature intended otherwise, it could have explicitly referred to the date the petition was filed, as it did elsewhere in the adoption statutes. See Ind. Code § 31-19-9-8(a)(1) (2023) (providing parental consent is not required “if the child is adjudged to have been abandoned or deserted for at least six (6) months immediately preceding the date of the filing of the petition for adoption”) (emphasis added).
Father’s contrary arguments are not persuasive. In his opening brief, Father claimed that notwithstanding the plain text of section 31-19-11-1, section 31-19- 2-7.5 “reveals that the anchor point is no later than the start of the first hearing on the adoption petition.” Appellant’s Br. at 14. Under section 31-19-2-7.5, a petitioner must have a criminal history check done through DCS or a licensed child-placing agency, and the results of that check must then be reported to the court under Indiana Code section 31-19-8-5. On their face, these statutes do not affect a petitioner’s eligibility to adopt; they merely ensure the trial court has the necessary information to determine whether the petitioner satisfies section 31- 19-11-1’s criminal history requirements.
Yet Father points to Indiana Code section 31-19-8-9, which provides that “[a]s soon as possible after” the criminal history check (among other requirements) “have been satisfied, the court shall proceed to hear and determine the petition for adoption.” Father reads “as soon as possible after” to mean a petitioner’s eligibility to adopt is determined by the date “of the first hearing on the . . . petition,” which cannot happen until after the criminal history report is filed. Appellant’s Br. at 14. But this argument fails on its own terms. Here, the court bifurcated the proceedings and did not hear evidence about Stepfather’s eligibility to adopt until April 2, 2026, at which time more than six months had passed since the five-year anniversary of Stepfather’s conviction. Indeed, the child-placing agency didn’t file Stepfather’s criminal history report until January 6, 2026, at which time Stepfather’s criminal history no longer made him ineligible to adopt under section 31-19-11-1(c).
Apparently recognizing this pitfall, Father took a different tack in his reply brief. There, Father argued public policy considerations require setting an anchor date “fixed at a point unaffected by the pace of litigation.” Appellant’s Reply Br. at 5. According to Father, the criminal history requirements are intended “to keep a specific class of recent, serious convictions out of the adoption process altogether,” a policy best served by making petitioners “wait out the remainder of the five-year period before filing at all.” Id. at 6-7.
While we understand Father’s policy concerns, “[i]t is not a proper function of this court to, in effect, rewrite a statute in order to render it consistent with our view of sound public policy,” let alone Father’s version of sound public policy. Robinson v. Monroe Cnty., 663 N.E.2d 196, 198 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), on reh’g of 658 N.E.2d 647 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995), trans. denied. We reiterate that if the legislature intended to make petitioners wait to file until section 31-19-11-1(c)’s five-year disqualification period expired, it could have required as much. But there is no such requirement in section 31-19-11-1. While the adoption statutes require a petitioner to disclose certain convictions, mandate criminal background checks, and bar the adoption if the petitioner’s criminal history is disqualifying, nothing prevents a person with prohibitive convictions from filing the petition in the first instance.
Affirmed.
Foley, J., and Felix, J., concur.