Pyle, J.
Tawk Hre (“Hre”) appeals the trial court’s restitution order. He argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered him to pay Katie Mumford (“Mumford”) restitution for her rental car expenses. Concluding that the trial court abused its discretion, we reverse and remand with instructions for the trial court to enter a corrected restitution order.
We reverse and remand with instructions.
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Hre argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered him to pay Mumford restitution for her rental car expenses. We agree.
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“Because restitution is penal in nature, the statute providing for restitution must be strictly construed against the State to avoid enlarging it beyond the fair meaning of the language used.” Morgan v. State, 49 N.E.3d 1091, 1094 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016).
Hre specifically argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered him to pay restitution to Mumford for her rental car expenses because the restitution statute does not provide for payment of such expenses. In support of his argument, Hre directs us to Person v. State, 93 N.E.3d 1126 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018). In the Person case, Person (“Person”) crashed his car into Rosa Bailey’s (“Bailey”) car while fleeing from the police. Person subsequently pleaded guilty to multiple offenses, and the trial court ordered him to pay restitution for, among other things, the cost of Bailey’s use of public transportation for the days that she did not have a car.
Person appealed the restitution order and argued that the trial court had abused its discretion when it had ordered him to pay for Bailey’s public transportation expenses because the restitution statute did not provide for the payment of such expenses. The State conceded that the trial court had abused its discretion.2 We agreed and reversed that portion of the trial court’s order that had ordered Person to pay restitution for Bailey’s public transportation expenses. Person, 93 N.E.3d at 1127.
We agree with Hre that the facts before us are analogous to the facts in the Person case. Specifically, the rental car expenses in this case are functionally indistinguishable from the public transportation expenses in Person. In other words, both the rental car expenses in this case and the public transportation expenses in Person represent the cost of alternative transportation incurred by a victim who lost the use of a vehicle as a result of the defendant’s criminal conduct. In addition, neither expense falls within any of the restitution statute’s five enumerated statutory categories. As a matter of public policy, it may make sense to order reimbursement of rental car expenses under the facts of this case, but it is a matter for our General Assembly to amend the statute governing what constitutes restitution in criminal cases.
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered Hre to pay Mumford restitution for her rental car expenses. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s restitution order and remand with instructions for the trial court to enter a corrected restitution order. See Person, 93 N.E.3d at 1127. See also Springer v. State, 798 N.E.2d 431, 436 (Ind. 2003) (affirming this Court’s determination that the trial court had abused its discretion in requiring Springer to pay the cost of airline tickets for the victim’s father because “the General Assembly has not authorized the trial court to include this expense in its restitution order because none of the statutory restitution categories includes any language that could be construed to authorize it”), reh’g denied; Rich v. State, 890 N.E.2d 44, 53 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (reversing trial court’s restitution order requiring Rich to pay for the cost of the victim’s security system because no portion of the restitution statute could be construed to authorize such an order), trans. denied.
Reversed and remanded with instructions.
Mathias, J., and Weissmann, J., concur