Vaidik, J.
Andrew T. Masterson’s sentence was modified to a community-corrections placement on the condition that he reside at a particular recovery house. The recovery house discharged him over two contested drug screens—despite a retest the next day being negative—and the State sought revocation of the community-corrections placement because Masterson was no longer at the program the trial court’s order required. The trial court found that Masterson violated the conditions of his placement, even though it questioned the recovery-house director’s credibility and recognized that the discharge was not Masterson’s fault. Masterson appeals, challenging only whether a violation occurred. We hold that the State proved a violation: under Woods v. State, 892 N.E.2d 637 (Ind. 2008), a probationer’s lack of fault does not bear on whether a violation occurred but only on the sanction imposed. Constrained by Woods, we affirm.
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Masterson claims that the trial court erred in finding that he violated his placement at Behind the Wire based on the two positive drug screens because they were not reliable and he tested negative the very next day. See Appellant’s Br. p. 12. But the trial court did not find that Masterson violated his placement based on those drug screens; the court disregarded them entirely. Instead, the court found that Masterson violated the conditions of his placement at Behind the Wire because he was dismissed from the program.
To the extent Masterson argues that the trial court applied an improper “strict liability” standard in finding that he violated the conditions of his placement at Behind the Wire, see id. at 10, this argument fails, too. In Woods, our Supreme Court explained: In one sense all probation requires “strict compliance.” That is to say probation is a matter of grace. And once the trial court extends this grace and sets its terms and conditions, the probationer is expected to comply with them strictly. If the probationer fails to do so, then a violation has occurred. 892 N.E.2d at 641 (citation omitted). Revocation, however, is not automatic, and a defendant must be given an opportunity to explain why his probation or community corrections should not be revoked:
[T]he very notion that violation of a probationary term will result in revocation no matter the reason is constitutionally suspect. For example, failure to pay a probation user fee where the probationer has no ability to pay certainly cannot result in a probation revocation. And what of a probationer not reporting to his probation officer because he was in a coma in a hospital? Or consider a failed urinalysis test because of prescription medication a probationer is taking on orders from his treating physician.
Id. (citations omitted, emphasis added). The Court stated that lack of volition or willfulness is not a “defense” but rather should be considered in determining an appropriate sanction once a violation is found. Id. (citing United States v. Warner, 830 F.2d 651, 657-58 (7th Cir. 1987) (“While good faith and lack of willfulness does not preclude finding a probation violation, defendant could and did raise his alleged good faith before the court as a factor for the court to consider in deciding whether to revoke probation.”)).
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Here, Masterson doesn’t dispute that he was discharged from Behind the Wire, the program where the trial court’s modification order required him to reside as a condition of his community-corrections placement. His discharge was therefore a violation of that condition. As in Trejo, Masterson’s contention that the discharge was not his fault—that he was terminated over contested drug screens—does not bear on whether a violation occurred; it is relevant only to the appropriate sanction, if any, once a violation is found. See Woods, 892 N.E.2d at 641; Trejo, 211 N.E.3d at 593. Because the State proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Masterson violated the conditions of his placement, the trial court did not err in its step-one determination. We acknowledge that this violation will appear on Masterson’s record even though his dismissal from Behind the Wire was entirely attributable to Highberger’s questionable conduct. But we are constrained by Woods to hold that a violation occurred. Woods recognizes that a probationer who misses an appointment because he is in a coma has nonetheless committed a violation, with his condition bearing only on the sanction. If there is a change to Woods, it must come from our Supreme Court. We therefore affirm.
Affirmed. Bailey, J., and Scheele, J., concur.