DeBoer, J.
The State charged Dylan Burton with Class A misdemeanor assisting a criminal, alleging he harbored, concealed, or assisted a fugitive from justice. Burton was convicted following a bench trial. On appeal, he argues the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction because the State failed to prove the person he assisted was a “fugitive from justice” under the assisting a criminal statute, Indiana Code section 35-44.1-2-5(a). The single issue on appeal is whether proving a person is a fugitive from justice under that statute requires evidence of interstate flight. Because we conclude the statute unambiguously does not impose such a requirement, we affirm.
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Burton argues the State failed to prove Graham was a “fugitive from justice” because “[t]here was no evidence of interstate flight.”
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Under Indiana Code section 35-44.1-2-5(a),
[a] person not standing in the relation of parent, child, or spouse to another person who has committed a crime or is a fugitive from justice who, with intent to hinder the apprehension or punishment of the other person, harbors, conceals, or otherwise assists the person commits assisting a criminal, a Class A misdemeanor.
Generally, “[t]he assisting a criminal statute . . . appl[ies] to people who did not actively participate in the crime itself, but who did assist a criminal after he or she committed a crime.” Jacobs v. State, 148 N.E.3d 1175, 1178 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (quoting Hauk v. State, 729 N.E.2d 994, 999 (Ind. 2000)). Under the statute, the State must prove the defendant intended to hinder the assisted party’s apprehension or punishment, regardless of whether the person assisted was charged with or convicted of a crime. Id. at 1179. To prove this mental state, the State must show the defendant “had reason to believe that the assisted person was subject to apprehension or punishment.” Id. Regarding the action the defendant must have taken, “harbor means ‘to shelter, to give refuge, to lodge, care for and protect’; conceal means ‘to hide, secrete, to keep out of sight, or prevent the discovery of’; and assist ‘contemplates some positive, affirmative act intended to help or aid someone to escape arrest, capture or punishment.’” Id. (quoting Clements v. State, 808 N.E.2d 198, 200 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), reh’g denied.
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Relying on this trio of cases, Burton argues his conviction must be reversed because the State produced no evidence Graham fled Indiana while she had an active warrant. See Appellant’s Reply Br. at 8 (emphasizing the nearly forty year “unbroken line of precedent” requiring proof of interstate flight). In contrast, the State asks us to abandon the interstate flight requirement, asserting it is contrary to the plain meaning of the term “fugitive from justice.” See Appellee’s Br. at 9 (arguing the Frost panel merely “graft[ed] extradition law onto [the] statute”). Both parties contend the term is unambiguous in their favor.
Preliminarily, the State correctly points out that Indiana does not follow horizontal stare decisis, meaning “each panel of this Court has coequal authority on an issue and considers any previous decisions by other panels but is not bound by those decisions.” Brown v. Charles Sturdevant Post of Am. Legion Post #46, 270 N.E.3d 962, 969 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (quoting In re C.F., 911 N.E.2d 657, 658 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009)). That said, because continuity and predictability are important features of our jurisprudence, the doctrine of stare decisis is considered “especially compelling in matters of statutory interpretation.” Ladra v. State, 177 N.E.3d 412, 420 (Ind. 2021) (quoting Myers v. Crouse-Hinds Div. of Cooper Indus., 53 N.E.3d 1160, 1163 (Ind. 2016), reh’g denied). Accordingly, “we must follow the previous decisions of this Court construing a statute unless provided with a strong reason justifying departure.” Montgomery v. State, 250 N.E.3d 478, 483 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024), trans. denied.
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Similarly, while the Legislature did not define “fugitive from justice” in section 35-44.1-2-5, we know it could have narrowly defined the term to require interstate flight because it expressly did so in another statute. Indiana Code section 35-47-2-1.5(b) prohibits certain persons, including fugitives from justice, from “knowingly or intentionally carry[ing] a handgun[.]” For purposes of that statute only, the Legislature defined “fugitive from justice” as “any person who . . . flees or leaves any state to avoid prosecution for a felony or misdemeanor offense[] or . . . flees or leaves any state to avoid testifying in a criminal proceeding.” I.C. § 35-47-2-1.5(a)(6).
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Because we find nothing indicating the Legislature intended a technical or narrow definition of “fugitive from justice” to apply in this context, the plain language must control. Applying its plain meaning, the term is unambiguous in that it is not limited to situations when a person flees the jurisdiction. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court provided persuasive reasoning and reached the same conclusion when it considered a firearm possession statute that left “fugitive from justice” undefined. In Commonwealth v. Smith, the court “consider[ed] whether a person who is subject to a bench warrant is a ‘fugitive from justice’ such that he is a ‘person not to possess, use, control, sell, transfer or manufacture’ a firearm . . . .” 234 A.3d 576, 579 (Pa. 2020). As in this case, the parties disputed whether interstate flight was required. Id. at 581-82. After reviewing some of the same dictionary definitions put forth here, the court concluded it was not…
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Finally, the doctrine of legislative acquiescence does not compel continued adherence to the interstate flight requirement that was promulgated in Frost. See Appellant’s Br. at 13 (“Our legislature has implicitly acquiesced, if not embraced Frost, Myers, and Lafferty.”). Legislative acquiescence is the proposition that “judicial interpretation of a statute, accompanied by substantial legislative inaction for a considerable time, may be understood to signify the Legislature’s acquiescence in and agreement with the judicial interpretation.” Montgomery, 250 N.E.3d at 483. In addition to the fact that our Supreme Court has yet to consider the interstate flight requirement in this context—either directly or through a petition to transfer—it has held that the doctrine of legislative acquiescence is “irrelevant” when the plain language controls the interpretive analysis, as it does here. State v. S.T., 82 N.E.3d 257, 261 (Ind. 2017) (“[W]e stress again that the hierarchy of interpretive principles moots the concept of legislative acquiescence—the clear statutory language makes it unnecessary to resort to other statutory construction rules.” (quoting Jackson v. State, 50 N.E.3d 767, 775 (Ind. 2016))) (alteration in original), as modified.
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the plain language of “fugitive from justice” justifies departing from Frost, Myers, and Lafferty and hold that the assisting a criminal statute does not require proof of the assisted party’s interstate flight when the State charges a defendant with having assisted a fugitive from justice. Thus, we affirm Burton’s conviction.
Affirmed.
Altice, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.