Najam, S.J.
The State brings this interlocutory appeal, challenging the trial court’s order ruling that evidence of the alleged victim’s prior accusations against others of sexual misconduct and rape could be introduced in the prosecution against her uncle, David E. Watson. The State charged Watson with four counts of sexual misconduct with a minor and two counts of child exploitation as to M.S., his niece, the complaining witness. Concluding that M.S.’s prior accusations were neither recanted nor shown to be demonstrably false, we reverse and remand.
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The State argues that the trial court erred by ruling that M.S.’s prior allegations would be admissible at trial, contending their admission would violate the Rape Shield Rule as they were not shown to be demonstrably false.
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Evidence Rule 412(a) prohibits the admission of evidence offered to prove that a victim or witness engaged in other sexual behavior to prove a victim’s or witness’s sexual predisposition in a criminal proceeding involving alleged sexual misconduct. However, evidence of specific instances of a victim’s or witness’s sexual behavior is admissible if offered to prove that someone else was the source of semen, injury, or other physical evidence, or to prove consent, and exclusion of that evidence would violate the defendant’s constitutional rights. Evid. R. 412(b).
Significant to our discussion here is the common-law exception that survived the adoption of the Indiana Rules of Evidence. See Walton, 715 N.E.2d at 826- 27. “This exception provides that evidence of a prior accusation of rape is admissible if: (1) the victim has admitted that her prior accusation of rape is false; or (2) the victim’s prior accusation is demonstrably false.” Graham, 736 N.E.2d at 825. “In presenting such evidence, the defendant is not probing the complaining witness’s sexual history.” Id. “Rather, the defendant proffers the evidence for impeachment purposes to demonstrate that the complaining witness has previously made false accusations of rape.” Id. “Viewed in this light, evidence of prior false rape accusations is more properly understood as verbal conduct, not sexual conduct.” Id. “Consequently, its admission does not run afoul of the Rape Shield Rule.” Id.
Defining “demonstrably false,” has proven to be elusive. “False” is a term readily understood as being untrue. But what does it mean to be “demonstrably false?”
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On transfer in State v. Walton, our Supreme Court acknowledged our earlier observation in that case that “while ‘no bright line rule can be established’ for determining whether a prior accusation is demonstrably false, the demonstrably false standard is ‘more stringent than a mere credibility determination.’” 715 N.E.2d at 828 (quoting State v. Walton, 692 N.E.2d 496, 501 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998) (vacated on transfer)).
We note that, in the present case, the trial court did not provide an explanation for its determination that the prior accusations were demonstrably false, just that Watson had met his burden. And we will not speculate as to the court’s rationale. But we pause now to note how the facts of this case differ from the ones discussed above and explain why the trial court’s decision must be reversed.
Here, Watson seeks the introduction of M.S.’s three prior allegations of sexual abuse, involving sexual misconduct and rape.3 The record before us reveals that M.S. did not admit that her prior accusations were false. And Watson offered no evidence to suggest that her accusations were demonstrably false.
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Under Indiana Law, “[p]rior accusations are demonstrably false where the victim has admitted the falsity of the charges or they have been disproved.” Fugett v. State, 812 N.E.2d 846, 849 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). According to our case law, and our review of the record, Watson has not met his burden of establishing that the claims are demonstrably false, and we must reverse the trial court’s preliminary evidentiary ruling.
The trial court’s determination that Watson had met his burden of establishing the admissibility of M.S.’s prior accusations of sexual abuse and/or rape was clearly erroneous because Watson did not show that M.S. admitted that they were false or that the prior accusations were demonstrably false. Accordingly, we must reverse the trial court’s decision and remand this matter for further proceedings.
Reversed and remanded.
Vaidik, J., and Scheele, J., concur.