Tavitas, C.J.
Following a jury trial, Michael Williams was convicted of child molesting, a Level 4 felony, and sexual misconduct with a minor, a Level 5 felony. The trial court sentenced Williams to an aggregate term of eleven years in the Indiana Department of Correction (“DOC”). Williams appeals and argues that the trial court erred by denying him credit time for the period he was on pretrial GPS monitoring. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm.
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Indiana Code Section 35-50-6-3.1(b)-(d) (2016)6 in relevant part provided, “A person earns . . . good time credit for . . . days the person is imprisoned for a crime or confined awaiting trial or sentencing,” and subsection (f) provided “A person . . . earns . . . good time credit for . . . days the person serves on pretrial home detention awaiting trial.”
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Although the relevant statute provides for credit time for pretrial home detention, here, the trial court made clear in its original bond and conditional pretrial release order that Williams was placed on GPS monitoring and that this was “not an order for Home Detention.” 7 App. Vol. II pp. 23-24. Williams does not dispute that conclusion on appeal. The statutes do not specifically provide for credit time for pretrial GPS monitoring. Instead, Williams argues that pretrial GPS monitoring constitutes a form of confinement and that he was, therefore, “entitled to credit time.” Appellant Br. p. 6. The issue before us is, thus, whether GPS monitoring falls within the meaning of “confinement” under Indiana Code Chapter 35-50-6 (2016) such that Williams is entitled to accrued time and good-time credit for his pretrial GPS monitoring.
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Similarly, here, we conclude that Williams’ pretrial GPS monitoring did not constitute confinement because it was even less restrictive than the halfway house placement in Hickman. Although Williams did not voluntarily request GPS monitoring, he nevertheless retained a substantial degree of freedom of movement. Williams was able to work, as reflected in the record and in his counsel’s argument that he was “the sole financial provider” for his family. Tr. Vol. III p. 250. Williams was monitored but was not restricted as to the places he could go.
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The only meaningful geographic restriction imposed on Williams stemmed from the no-contact order between him and one of the victims in this case. Williams was ordered not to be present at a location where he “knew [the victim] to be located” while released on bond. Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 36. That restriction was not imposed by GPS monitoring but was a precautionary measure resulting from Williams’ offenses and designed to protect the victim given the nature of the case. GPS monitoring itself did not exclude Williams from any areas; the restriction flowed from his conduct toward the victim.
GPS monitoring was a special condition of Williams’ pretrial release to which he agreed. Williams did not agree to that condition merely to save “the State a great deal of money” or to confer “a considerable benefit to the taxpayers,” as he claims. Appellant’s Br. p. 7. Rather, Williams sought release so that he could provide for his family and enjoy the freedom of being “out of custody,” as his counsel argued at trial. Tr. Vol. III p. 250. Having accepted those conditions to obtain his release, Williams cannot now recharacterize them as “confinement” entitling him to credit toward his sentence. We, therefore, find his argument unpersuasive. Accordingly, we conclude that Williams is not entitled to accrued time under the statute.
Next, regarding good time credit, Williams is not entitled to good time credit because it is awarded for “the person’s good behavior while imprisoned or confined.” Ind. Code § 35-50-6-0.5. Since Williams was not confined under GPS monitoring and did not accrue any time toward the sentence, he was not entitled to good time credit. See Maciaszek v. State, 75 N.E.3d 1089, 1093 n.5 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (“As Maciaszek is not entitled to credit for actual time served against his Indiana Sentence, he is also not entitled to good time credit, which allows for extra days of credit based on the credit class of the offender and the actual days the offender served. See Ind. Code § 35-50-6-3 (good credit time statute).”).
In summary, the trial court did not err when it denied Williams’ request for credit for the time he spent on pretrial GPS monitoring.
Because the trial court did not err by denying Williams’ request for credit for the time he spent on pretrial GPS monitoring, we affirm.
Affirmed.
Bailey, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.