Bradford, J.
While Indiana statutory authority provides that a search warrant shall be executed within ten days of issuance, see Indiana Code section 35-33-5-7(b), the Indiana Code is silent as to whether evidence recovered in connection with an untimely executed warrant may still be admissible or whether such evidence must be excluded. We often look to federal authority for guidance in situations where Indiana precedent is silent. As it relates to the question before us today, federal law provides that while exclusion of the evidence is one potential outcome, if the probable cause supporting the issuance of the warrant remains, exclusion is not required unless the defendant was prejudiced by the delay and the delay was the result of deliberate disregard for the law by the investigating law-enforcement officers.
In this case, Connor Bosworth was charged with two counts of Level 4 felony child exploitation, sixteen counts of Level 5 felony child exploitation, ten counts of Level 5 felony possession of child pornography, and five counts of Level 6 felony possession of child pornography. He was convicted on all counts following a bench trial and was sentenced to an aggregate sixty-four-year sentence, of which twenty-three years were suspended to probation.
Bosworth contends that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting certain evidence recovered in connection with a search warrant that had been served on Meta regarding his social-media accounts, claiming that the evidence in question should have been excluded because the warrant had not been timely executed. Finding the relevant federal guidance to be persuasive and applying it to the facts of this case, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the challenged evidence. We also conclude that Bosworth’s sentence is not inappropriate. Bosworth’s convictions and sentence are affirmed.
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Indiana Code section 35-33-5-7(b) provides that “[e]xcept as provided in subsection (f), a search warrant must be: (1) executed not more than ten (10) days after the date of issuance[.]” Bosworth argues that because the warrant was not executed within the ten days allowed for by Indiana Code section 35-33-5-7(b), the evidence had to be excluded from trial.
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Additionally, we acknowledge Indiana authority suggesting that the question of timeliness of execution of a search warrant does not stop with application of Indiana Code section 35-33-5-7 alone. For example, in Huffines v. State, 739 N.E.2d 1093, 1097 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), trans. denied, we concluded that a search warrant, which had been executed within the ten-day statutory period, had been improperly executed because the probable cause supporting the issuance of the search warrant had dissipated. Our opinion in Huffines indicates that the relevant question is not merely when a warrant was executed but rather whether probable cause remained at the time of execution.
The parties have cited no Indiana authority that indicates that a violation of Indiana Code section 35-33-5-7(b) necessitates exclusion of the evidence, and we find none. In fact, we have found no Indiana caselaw indicating how a trial court should handle evidence discovered as a result of an untimely-executed warrant. When Indiana law is silent on a question, we may look to guidance from an interpretation of a similar question by the federal courts. See Robinson v. State, 682 N.E.2d 806, 810 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (providing that when confronted by an issue for the first time, we may look to guidance from federal interpretations of similar questions).
The federal counterpart to Indiana Code section 35-33-5-7(b) is Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(e)(2)(A)(i), which provides that an officer must “execute the warrant within a specified time no longer than 14 days.” The United States District Courts for the First and Second Districts have recognized that “‘unreasonable delay in the execution of a warrant that results in the lapse of probable cause will invalidate a warrant.’” U.S. v. Syphers, 426 F.3d 461, 469 (1st Cir. 2005) (quoting U.S. v. Marin-Buitrago, 734 F.2d 889, 894 (2d Cir. 1984)).
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A “[d]elay in executing a warrant beyond the time set forth in the rule is not unreasonable unless, at the time it is executed, probable cause no longer exists and the defendant demonstrates legal prejudice as a result of the delay.” Triumph Cap. Grp., 211 F.R.D. at 66. As such, “‘noncompliance with Rule 41 does not automatically require exclusion of evidence in a federal prosecution. Instead, exclusion is required only if a defendant is prejudiced or if reckless disregard of proper procedure is evident.’” U.S. v. Mutschelknaus, 592 F.3d 826, 829 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting U.S. v. Spencer, 439 F.3d 905, 913 (8th Cir. 2006)).
Applying the federal precedent to the case at hand, we must consider whether the probable cause had dissipated by the time the warrant was executed, Bosworth was prejudiced by the delay, and reckless disregard for proper procedure was evident. Bosworth does not claim on appeal that probable cause had dissipated or that the delay in executing the warrant was due to any misconduct or reckless disregard by the investigating officers. Likewise, he does not argue, much less establish, that he was prejudiced by the delay.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
May, J., and Mathias, J., concur.