Foley, J.
First Financial Bank, N.A. (“Bank”) obtained a Garnishment Order that required Brogut Investments, LLC (“Employer”) to garnish the wages of Jacob Vanhoose (“Vanhoose”). Bank appeals following unsuccessful proceedings supplemental against Employer, presenting two restated issues for review:
I. Whether Bank is entitled to a judgment against Employer for unremitted amounts subject to the Garnishment Order; and
II. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in declining to find Employer in contempt for noncompliance with the Garnishment Order.
Concluding Bank is entitled to a judgment against Employer for unremitted amounts, but there was no abuse of discretion in declining to find Employer in contempt, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand with instructions.
…
Here, there is no dispute that the trial court entered the Garnishment Order under Indiana Code section 34-55-8-7, which clearly and unambiguously calls for entry of a “continuing lien” on the judgment debtor’s property. I.C. § 34-55- 8-7(c) (emphasis added). Indeed, the Garnishment Order was titled Continuing Garnishment Order and stated that Employer “shall continue to deduct from the disposable earnings of [Vanhoose] until such time as the Court issues an order releasing the Garnishment Order.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 45 (emphasis added). There is also no dispute that the trial court had personal jurisdiction over Employer, who received notice of the proceedings supplemental and service of the Garnishment Order. Furthermore, Indiana Code section 34-25-3- 3 holds a garnishee defendant accountable to the judgment creditor for omitted remittances, specifying as follows: “From the day of the service of the summons, the garnishee is accountable to the [judgment creditor] in the action for the amount of money, property, or credits in the garnishee’s possession or due and owing from the garnishee to the [judgment debtor].”
Employer nonetheless maintains that “when the employment relationship ends, so too do[] the garnishment obligations—unless and until renewed by court action.” Appellee’s Br. p. 9. Employer’s first contention is correct in that, if there is no employment relationship with the judgment debtor, there is nothing to garnish, i.e., the garnishee defendant is simply not in possession of the judgment debtor’s property. However, Employer’s second contention is incorrect—so long as the Garnishment Order stands, there is an ongoing obligation to comply with it. Indeed, pursuant to statute, a garnishment order functions as a “continuing lien” against the judgment debtor’s property. I.C. § 34-55-8-7(c) (emphasis added). The statute does not contain self-terminating language. Rather, it contemplates termination of garnishment obligations upon further action of the court, e.g., when the judgment debtor has a change in employers and the judgment creditor seeks a new garnishment order under the procedures set forth in subsection (h). See I.C. § 34-55-8-7(h). In this case, Employer could have sought relief from the Garnishment Order by informing the court of a change in employment and requesting that the Garnishment Order be terminated. However, absent further action, the Garnishment Order applied, imposing a duty to garnish Vanhoose’s earnings.
….
All in all, because the Garnishment Order was a continuing lien, Employer remained obligated to garnish Vanhoose’s earnings. This obligation persisted, irrespective of Employer’s notice to Bank about the change in employment. For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the trial court erred in declining to enter judgment against Employer for failing to garnish Vanhoose’s earnings from February 2024 through October 2024. We therefore reverse and remand with instruction.
…
In light of the evidence indicating that Employer did not willfully disobey the Garnishment Order, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its decision in declining to find Employer in contempt of the Garnishment Order.
Conclusion
Because the Garnishment Order had continuing effect, we conclude that the trial court erred in declining to enter judgment against Employer for the missed remittances upon re-employment of Vanhoose. However, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to find Employer in contempt for the missed remittances. Therefore, although we affirm the trial court’s contempt decision, we reverse and remand with instructions to enter a monetary judgment against Employer for missed remittances from February 2024 through October 2024.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions.
Kenworthy, J. and Scheele, J., concur.