Molter, J.
Through a final order, the Monroe County Board of Zoning Appeals (BZA) granted Bedford Recycling, Inc. a conditional use permit to build a scrap metal collection and sorting facility. Eleven months later, the BZA revoked the permit because it decided it had made a legal error—on further reflection, the BZA explained, it concluded the facility did not satisfy the requirements of a conditional use permit. But no statute authorizes the BZA to reconsider its final orders, so we must decide whether the BZA has inherent or common law authority to do so. We conclude it does not.
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The question presented is whether the BZA had the authority to reconsider its final order granting Bedford a conditional use permit. That is a purely legal question we consider de novo. See Noblesville, Ind. Bd. of Zoning Appeals v. FMG Indianapolis, LLC, 217 N.E.3d 510, 514 (Ind. 2023). Bedford argues the BZA did not have that power because the BZA is a creature of statute, and no statute authorizes reconsideration. The BZA responds that it did have that power, relying on a line of Court of Appeals cases that say administrative bodies have common law authority to reconsider decisions that are based on a legal error.
We agree with Bedford. In Part I, we discuss our longstanding precedent establishing that administrative bodies lack inherent or common law authority to reconsider final decisions. In Part II, we explain why we disapprove of the Court of Appeals cases carving out an exception to that rule for legal errors. And in Part III, we explain our holding that the BZA had no authority to reconsider Bedford’s conditional use permit.
I. Administrative bodies have no common law or inherent authority to reconsider final orders.
BZAs are administrative bodies, Kunz v. Waterman, 283 N.E.2d 371, 374 (Ind. 1972), which means they are statutory creatures limited to the powers conferred by their enabling acts, Blue v. Beach, 56 N.E. 89, 93 (Ind. 1900).3 And we have long held that a statutorily created administrative entity possesses no common law authority supplementing the authority of its enabling statutes…
Critical here, we have said this limitation means an agency cannot reconsider its own final decisions unless the legislature explicitly grants the agency that power. Cress v. State, 152 N.E. 822, 826 (Ind. 1926) (“[P]ower to undo an act once done will not be implied from the mere grant of power, in the exercise of a sound discretion, to do the act.”); see also Smith, 69 N.E.2d at 17 (“We do not believe that the grant of authority to correct clerical errors or mistakes of fact can be interpreted to mean that the Board may at any time grant a new hearing upon the essential necessary issues which have been determined.”). The legislature does sometimes give administrative bodies that power explicitly. See, e.g., I.C. § 4-21.5-3-31(a) (granting the “ultimate authority . . . jurisdiction to modify a final order” in limited circumstances). In other words, when the legislature is silent, we infer it meant to withhold that power. See ESPN, Inc. v. Univ. of Notre Dame Police Dep’t, 62 N.E.3d 1192, 1195 (Ind. 2016) (“As we interpret the statute, we are mindful of both what it does say and what it does not say.” (quotations omitted)).
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II. We disapprove of the “error of law” exception some Court of Appeals cases have recognized.
A conflicting line of Court of Appeals cases emerged recognizing an “error of law” exception: “[w]hen an administrative entity recognizes its own error of law, it may correct that error.” Adkins v. City of Tell City, 625 N.E.2d 1298, 1302 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993). This exception derives from misplaced reliance on inapplicable precedent.
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Neither case cites any authority justifying a deviation from our Court’s precedents disclaiming any inherent or common law authority for administrative bodies to reconsider final decisions. Nor do those cases or Adkins confront the foundational principles underlying our precedents— administrative bodies are creatures of statute; the legislature explicitly directs when those bodies have the authority to reconsider their final decisions; and we infer from the legislature’s silence that a body does not have that power. We therefore disapprove of the exception recognized in Essroc, ANR Pipeline, and Adkins, and we reaffirm our precedent that there is no common law or inherent authority for an administrative body to reconsider its final order based on an error of law.
III. The BZA here had no authority to reconsider the conditional use permit.
Having rejected the “error of law” line of cases, we look to the BZA’s enabling statutes to see whether those laws authorize any reconsideration power. We conclude they do not.
BZAs derive their authority from a series of statutes under Title 36, Article 7, Chapter 4 of the Indiana Code. See generally I.C. §§ 36-7-4-900 to 36-7-4-924 (collectively, “the 900 series” governing the board’s powers and operation); I.C. §§ 36-7-4-1000 to 36-7-4-1019 (collectively, the “1000 series” governing remedies and enforcement); I.C. §§ 36-7-4-1600 to 36-7-4-1616 (collectively, the “1600 series” governing judicial review). A review of those statutes reveals no contemplation, let alone a grant, of BZA authority to rescind a decision once it has been made. The BZA has conceded as much throughout this litigation—including in oral argument before this Court—by acknowledging that the only authority it could rely on was the common law.
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Because the Monroe County BZA has no statutory authority allowing for reconsideration or revocation of a final decision, it acted outside the scope of its power in revoking Bedford Recycling’s conditional use permit. [Footnote omitted.]
Conclusion
For these reasons, we affirm the trial court’s order vacating the BZA’s revocation order and reinstating Bedford Recycling’s conditional use permit.
Rush, C.J., and Massa and Slaughter, JJ., concur.
Goff, J., dissents in part and concurs in the judgment with separate opinion.
Goff, J., dissenting in part and concurring in the judgment.
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The Court affirms the trial court’s reinstatement of the permit, albeit because the “BZA has no inherent or common law authority” to correct its errors of law. Ante, at 2. I respectfully dissent as to the Court’s holding that an agency cannot correct its own errors of law without explicit statutory authority. But because the BZA corrected its error of law after an unreasonable amount of time, I concur in the Court’s decision to reinstate the permit.
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I would adopt the error-of-law exception recognized by the Court of Appeals. Like the inherent authority trial courts may exercise to reconsider certain orders, the error-of-law exception gives administrative agencies the ability to reconsider erroneous decisions…
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But to promote the finality of administrative decisions, I would only apply the error-of-law exception within a reasonable time after an agency decision was made. Finality “provides certainty and stability” and “protects the interests of parties by enabling closure.”…